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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although courts have traditionally relied primarily on prosecutors’ individual 
self-restraint and institutional self-regulation to curb prosecutors’ excesses and 
redress their wrongdoing, 1  aspects of prosecutors’ conduct can be regulated 
externally as well.  One potential source of external regulation is professional 
discipline.  As lawyers, prosecutors are regulated by state courts, which oversee 
processes for disciplining lawyers who engage in misconduct.2  In responding to 
prosecutors’ wrongdoing, courts generally express a preference for professional 
discipline over civil liability, which is limited by principles of absolute and 
qualified immunity. 3   Likewise, courts favor professional discipline over 
adjudicatory remedies such as reversal of criminal convictions or suppression of 
evidence, which are often unavailable because of the harmless error doctrine and 
other limitations.4  
                                                                                                                            
 
   Louis Stein Chair and Director of the Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University 
School of Law. 
   Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center. 
1   See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) 
(“Much of what the United States Attorney’s office does isn’t open to public scrutiny or judicial 
review.  It is therefore particularly important that the government discharge its responsibilities fairly, 
consistent with due process. The overwhelming majority of prosecutors are decent, ethical, honorable 
lawyers who understand the awesome power they wield, and the responsibility that goes with it.”).  
See generally Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940). 
2   See, e.g., Bruce Green & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Rehabilitating Lawyers: Perceptions of 
Deviance and Its Cures in the Lawyer Reinstatement Process, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139 (2012); 
Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
3   See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (rejecting municipal liability for Brady 
violations); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding prosecutors performing 
investigative functions are entitled to qualified immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 
(1976) (rejecting civil rights claim against prosecutor and explaining that “a prosecutor stands 
perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his 
amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers”).   
4   See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988) (rejecting 
dismissal of indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury proceeding in case of 
harmless error, finding that “the court may direct a prosecutor to show cause why he should not be 
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For many years, however, the conventional wisdom has been that disciplinary 
authorities do not effectively regulate prosecutors.5  Studies have concluded that 
prosecutors are rarely disciplined, even when a judge presiding over a criminal 
case finds that the prosecutor acted improperly.6  Further, many observers have 
asserted that in the rare cases of discipline, courts typically let prosecutors off too 
lightly. 7   Disciplinary authorities’ deferential treatment of prosecutors, though 
perhaps subject to explanation,8 remains, in the view of many commentators, also 
                                                                                                                            
disciplined and request the bar or the Department of Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings 
against him”); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983) (citation omitted) 
(rejecting reversal of conviction in case of harmless error, suggesting instead that “the court could 
have dealt with the offending argument by directing the District Court to order the prosecutor to show 
cause why he should not be disciplined, or by asking the Department of Justice to initiate a 
disciplinary proceeding against him”); United States v. McRae, 795 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2015); In 
re Larsen, No. 20140535, 2016 WL 3369545, at *6 (Utah June 16, 2016) (upholding discipline 
regardless of the absence of a Brady violation) (“The question under Brady is a matter of due process 
. . . . But rule 3.8(d)’s focus is different. It is aimed not only at assuring a fair trial—by articulating a 
standard for a motion for a new one—but also at establishing an ethical duty that will avoid the 
problem in the first place.”).  But see, e.g., United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 355 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming reversal due to “[t]he district court’s steady drip of discoveries of misconduct infecting 
every stage of this prosecution, combined with the government’s continued obfuscation and deceit”); 
United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2012) (remanding for district court to 
consider dismissing the indictment with prejudice as a sanction for prosecutorial misconduct); People 
v. Velasco-Palacios, 235 Cal. App. 4th 439 (2015) (affirming dismissal of indictment as sanction for 
prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence during plea negotiations). 
5   See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Preface, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 
iii, xl (2015) (describing “futility of getting bar disciplinary boards to impose 
professional discipline for misconduct committed in the course of criminal prosecutions”). 
6   See, e.g., Matt Ferner, Prosecutors Are Almost Never Disciplined for Misconduct, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/prosecutor-misconduct-
justice_us_56bce00fe4b0c3c55050748a; Kozinski, supra note 5, at xl (asserting that “[t]here have 
been a few instances of professional discipline against prosecutors, though . . . much less than against 
similarly-situated private lawyers” and that “professional organizations are exceedingly reluctant to 
impose sanctions on prosecutors for misconduct in carrying out their professional responsibilities”); 
see also Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping the 
Contours of Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 81 (2012) (citing “the small number of 
sanctions against prosecutors, relative to lawyers as a whole”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional 
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 725 (2001) (describing the “rarity of discipline” of 
prosecutors).  
7   See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108, 120 (Okla. 2013) 
(finding “[i]nstances of prosecutorial misconduct from previous decades . . . were often met with 
nothing more than a reprimand or a short suspension”); id. at n.40 (citing sources); cf. MacLean & 
Wilks, supra note 6, at 62 (finding that in “extreme cases of unethical prosecutorial behavior . . . 
states’ attorney discipline systems act swiftly and harshly,” but that “[o]n the lower end of unethical 
prosecutorial behavior, the penalties appear to be somewhat rare and usually minimal when the line 
between unethical behavior and mere prosecutorial error is blurred”). 
8   See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 6, at 725 (finding that “[m]any of the rules of professional 
conduct . . . are . . . altogether inapplicable, or barely applicable, to full-time prosecutors” and “[t]his, 
combined with the special characteristics of prosecutors and the activities they engage in, helps 
explain the rarity of discipline”). 
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subject to criticism, if not altogether unjustifiable.  Accordingly, critics urge 
disciplinary agencies to pursue prosecutors more aggressively, especially for forms 
of recurring wrongdoing such as improper closing arguments or withholding of 
exculpatory evidence.9   
A handful of recent high-profile disciplinary cases, beginning with Mike 
Nifong’s disbarment in 2007, give the impression that disciplinary agencies are 
getting more serious about responding to prosecutorial misconduct, and the public 
continues to pressure them to do so.  But many legal scholars assume that even if 
professional discipline grows more robust with regard to certain areas of 
prosecutorial conduct, professional discipline can never be effective with regard to 
one broad, significant, and notably problematic area of prosecutorial conduct: the 
abusive exercise of prosecutorial discretion, especially with regard to charging and 
plea bargaining.10  U.S. Supreme Court decisions and other case law establish that 
federal judges presiding over criminal cases are generally required, for reasons 
relating to constitutional separation of powers, to defer to prosecutors’ decisions 
about whether to initiate or dismiss criminal charges.11  Commentators suggest that 
similar concerns prevent state courts from implementing meaningful regulation of 
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions through the disciplinary process.12    
                                                                                                                            
 
9  See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical 
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (2007); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to 
Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC L. REV. 275 (2004). 
10  See, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, 
143–61 (2007); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. 
REV. 669, 678–82 (1992); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 1521, 1525 (1981) (“[T]here are good reasons to see prosecutors’ virtually unlimited control 
over charging as inconsistent with a system of criminal procedure fair to defendants and to the 
public.”).   
11  See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.  
12  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010): 
[E]ven if they possess the necessary staffing and funds to engage in a proper inquiry into 
misconduct, state bars, which are typically arms of the judiciary, may be reluctant to dig 
too deeply into the operation of the prosecutor’s office out of concern that they will 
interfere with the workings of another part of government. 
Id. at 2096; Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 959, 977–78 (2009) (“Separation-of-powers concerns can also make bar authorities 
hesitate to intrude upon prosecutors’ province.”); Zacharias, supra note 6: 
[A]uthorities may sense a real separation of powers issue.  Ultimately, bar authorities in 
most jurisdictions operate under the rubric of the courts.  Prosecutors are members of the 
executive branch.  To the extent discipline requires an investigation of the workings of a 
prosecutor’s office, disciplinary agencies may consider it invasive of the authority of a 
coordinate branch of government.  On occasion, prosecutors have directly raised the 
claim that the application of particular professional rules to them violates the principle of 
separation of powers. 
Id. at 761. 
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 Responding to these concerns, this Article explores the role of professional 
discipline in regulating prosecutors’ work, focusing on disciplinary regulation of 
prosecutors’ charging decisions, which are typically thought to be discretionary 
and therefore off-limits to judicial review.  The subject is important.  Prosecutors’ 
discretionary decisions regarding whether to commence and continue a prosecution 
often determine the outcome of a criminal case.13  For many years, courts, scholars, 
bar associations, law reform organizations, and others have expressed concern 
about prosecutors’ abuse of this extraordinary power, documenting practices that 
appear to reflect political favoritism, 14 personal self-interest,15  undercharging, 16 
overcharging,17 arbitrariness,18 or bias,19 among other possible deficiencies.20   
Significantly, there is no consensus regarding how best to regulate 
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion.  Although some have favored legislative 
                                                                                                                            
 
13  See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat 
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408 (2001) (“The charging decision is arguably the most important 
prosecutorial power and the strongest example of the influence and reach of prosecutorial 
discretion.”); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197 (2016).  
14  See, e.g., Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 953 (2010); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
837, 847–48; Note, Prosecutor’s Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955). 
15  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2464, 2470–73 (2004) (describing ways prosecutors’ “pressures and incentives” affect plea 
bargain decisions); Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of 
Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 56 (2007) (“Scholars roundly critique prosecutors for pursuing 
self-interest and favorable statistics at the expense of the public interest.”). 
16  See, e.g., Tom Lininger, An Ethical Duty to Charge Batterers Appropriately, 22 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 173 (2015) (analyzing undercharging in domestic violence cases); Ronald 
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002); David 
Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for Real-Offense Sentencing, 91 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1434, 1435 (1997). 
17  See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701 (2014); Tracey L. 
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with 
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); Mitchell Stephens, Ignoring Justice: 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Ethics of Charging, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 53 (2008).   
18  See generally, DAVIS, supra note 10.  
19  See, e.g., Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial 
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion—Knowing There Will Be 
Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing 
Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 463 (2009); Anne Bowen Poulin, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. 
Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1081–82, 1085 (1997). 
20  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 973 (referencing “systemic concerns about equality, 
arbitrariness, leniency, and overcharging”).  See also Prosecutorial Oversight: A National Dialogue 
in the Wake of Connick v. Thompson, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 29, 2016), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/prosecutorial-oversight-national-dialogue-wake-connick-v-
thompson/; Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2764399.  
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oversight, 21  others view legislation as a “pipe dream,” particularly given the 
political pressure on legislators to appear tough on crime.22  Some urge more 
effective internal self-regulation, 23  but one might be skeptical of whether 
prosecutors can be persuaded to effectively rein in their own power.24  Still others 
urge that the courts or legislation should authorize expanded judicial review of 
prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining decisions, 25  but others view these 
alternatives as unrealistic, particularly in light of federal concerns over separation 
of powers.26   
Against this background, the possibility that judicial oversight through 
professional discipline may play a meaningful future role in regulating 
prosecutors’ discretionary decision making—notwithstanding the past 
ineffectiveness of discipline in regulating almost any aspect of prosecutors’ 
work—deserves consideration.  To be sure, expanded exercise of disciplinary 
authority leaves a number of issues unresolved, as discipline is traditionally limited 
to addressing misconduct, rather than responding to less substantial errors in 
judgment.  Moreover, on a broader level, any attempt to determine the optimal 
strategy to rein in prosecutorial abuse of discretion would involve a range of 
additional factors, including an examination of various ways discretion is used.27  
Nevertheless, given the current under-regulation of prosecutorial decision making, 
                                                                                                                            
 
21  See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1566–68.  See also DAVIS, supra note 10, at 180–89; 
Davis, supra note 13, at 462–63; Poulin, supra note 19, at 1119–22. 
22  Bibas, supra note 12, at 966.  See also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the 
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 911 (2009) (“The 
political process overwhelmingly favors prosecutors.  Any oversight by Congress would serve largely 
to make sure that prosecutors are being sufficiently tough. . . . [I]t is hard to imagine a scenario where 
Congress would put in place an oversight scheme that would offer greater protection for 
defendants.”). 
23  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 22; Bibas, supra note 12; Poulin, supra note 19, at 1122–24. 
24  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 22, at 917 (acknowledging difficulty in trying to “prompt 
prosecutors to change the view they have of themselves”). 
25  See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983). 
26  At least on the federal level, the question of whether courts could review charging decisions 
more strictly, either pursuant to legislative authorization or as a matter of inherent judicial authority, 
raises complicated questions of constitutional separation of powers.  Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654 (1988) (upholding statutory provisions of independent counsel law against arguments of judicial 
encroachment on prosecutor’s executive function); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) 
(upholding presumption that agency decisions not to institute proceedings are not subject to judicial 
review).  See generally William F. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United 
States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1325 (1993).  This article does not delve into these complex questions, though it emphasizes that, 
regardless of the federal view on separation-of-powers, state courts interpreting state constitutions 
can conceivably resolve these issues differently.  See infra Part IV. 
27  See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible 
Exit Strategies, 109 PA. ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005).   
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this article seeks to demonstrate the potential value of increased disciplinary 
authority.  In addition, discipline might serve a useful, interstitial function, as 
perhaps future laws will otherwise provide more meaningful restraints on 
prosecutors’ power. 
Part II of this Article discusses areas of misconduct for which prosecutors 
may be disciplined.  It argues that, although few ethics rules specifically target 
prosecutors’ work, a number of generally applicable rules potentially address much 
of what courts regard as prosecutorial misconduct.  In particular, courts have a 
degree of latitude to interpret the current rules to regulate abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
Part III offers a largely descriptive analysis of how ethics rules have been 
enforced to date in cases involving prosecutors’ professional work.  It argues that 
although ethics rules may remain largely under-enforced as applied to prosecutors, 
the Nifong case may mark a potential turning point, as some disciplinary 
authorities now appear to be responding more forcefully to prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Moreover, several disciplinary cases have been brought against high-
ranking elected prosecutors, driven substantially by concerns about abuses of 
charging power.   
Finally, Part IV considers the potential future role of professional discipline in 
responding to prosecutors’ abuse of charging discretion.  It focuses on 
commentators’ assumption that discipline is an unpromising route to redressing 
abuses of discretion because state courts in the disciplinary context, like federal 
courts in the adjudicatory context, must generally defer to prosecutors’ 
discretionary decision making.  We argue that federal separations of powers 
principles, which account for federal courts’ deference in adjudicating cases, are 
not universally applicable to state courts.  Indeed, state courts often exercise the 
authority to inquire into various aspects of prosecutors’ decision making, in both 
adjudicating criminal cases and sanctioning prosecutors who violate the 
constitution, statutes, or ethics rules. 
The harder question is whether courts can regulate prosecutors’ discretionary 
decision making in a manner similar to the regulation of prosecutors’ work as trial 
lawyers.  That is, may state courts, through rule making or interpretation, adopt 
independent ethical standards to govern prosecutors’ exercise of charging 
discretion and sanction prosecutors for abuses of discretion that contravene the 
applicable rules?  We show that at least some state courts exercise this authority as 
well, and in so doing, the courts appear to rely on firm doctrinal and policy 
grounds.  The Article does not explore whether an expansive interpretation of state 
courts’ disciplinary authority is ultimately justified under the various state 
constitutions.  However, the Article concludes that, to the extent courts exercise an 
increasingly robust form of professional discipline of prosecutors, one can expect 
to see more cases targeting not only discrete law-breaking but also more general 
prosecutorial abuses of power, including in areas often thought to be within the 
broad discretion of prosecutorial decision making. 
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II. ETHICS RULES REGULATING PROSECUTORS’ WORK 
  
State courts adopt codes of ethics, consisting of rules of professional conduct 
that regulate the work of lawyers licensed to practice law in the state or appearing 
in the state’s courts pro hac vice.28   States’ ethics rules are based largely, in 
substance and typically in form, on the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.29  Lawyers, including prosecutors, are subject to professional discipline, 
such as a private or public reprimand, suspension, or disbarment, for violating 
ethics rules.30  In most states, discipline is a quasi-criminal process overseen by the 
state judiciary.  In many states, staff lawyers or volunteer lawyers investigate, 
initiate and prosecute disciplinary cases, which are heard by lawyers or judges, 
subject to judicial review.31  A court presiding over a criminal case might conclude 
that particular prosecutorial conduct is wrongful, and in some instances, a 
prosecutor might be held up to judicial or public opprobrium for improper conduct, 
but the prosecutor cannot be professionally disciplined unless the conduct violates 
an ethics rule.  Consequently, the potential effectiveness of discipline as a 
regulatory mechanism depends in the first instance on the reach of the ethics rules. 
Although courts and commentators sometimes proclaim that prosecutors have 
different and higher ethical obligations than other lawyers, 32  this principle is 
largely absent from the ethics rules.33  In general, prosecutors are subject, at most, 
                                                                                                                            
 
28  See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of 
Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2009). 
29  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
30  See supra note 2.  
31  See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108, 113–14 (Okla. 2013) 
(explaining that Oklahoma court makes factual determinations and determines the sanction with 
assistance from representatives of the private bar who hear evidence and make recommendations).  
 32  For the classic judicial articulation of this principle, see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done.”).  See also, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 at 
1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (“Prosecutors are subject to constraints and responsibilities 
that don’t apply to other lawyers.  While lawyers representing private parties may—indeed, must—do 
everything ethically permissible to advance their clients’ interests, lawyers representing the 
government in criminal cases serve truth and justice first.”); Bruce A. Green, Why Should 
Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Samuel J. Levine, Taking 
Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to “Seek 
Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337 (2004). 
33  The ABA has relegated this idea to the comments to the rules.  See MODEL RULES r. 3.8, 
cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special 
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”). 
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to the same rules as all other lawyers.34  The rules most relevant to prosecutors are 
those governing advocacy35 and dealings with adversarial parties and witnesses.36  
For example, advocates may not knowingly make false statements to the court or 
knowingly offer or rely on false testimony.37  They are limited in making public 
communications while adjudicative proceedings are pending.38  In jury arguments, 
they may not assert personal knowledge of the facts or make factual assertions that 
find no support in the evidence.39  On their face, advocacy rules such as these 
apply no more to prosecutors than to other trial lawyers.  Moreover, it has been 
observed that the substance of most other ethics rules has little or no relevance to 
the work of prosecutors.40  Rules regulating the lawyer-client relationship are far 
less applicable to prosecutors than to lawyers representing private clients, and rules 
regulating a lawyer’s legal fees and marketing efforts are entirely irrelevant to 
prosecutors.41   
To be sure, courts have the authority to interpret ethics rules more creatively 
than statutes42 and to apply these rules differently in the context of prosecutors’ 
work, consistent with prosecutors’ unique duty to serve justice.43  Indeed, in some 
respects, courts have interpreted generally applicable ethics rules differently—
sometimes more restrictively, and sometimes less so—in addressing prosecutors’ 
conduct.44  For example, courts expect greater candor from prosecutors than from 
                                                                                                                            
 
34  Most of the Model Rules are rules of general applicability.  The ABA has not responded to 
suggestions that it craft specialized ethics rules for different areas of law practice.  See, e.g., Nancy B. 
Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for 
the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing 
Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169 (1997).  The special rule for prosecutors is the most 
prominent exception.  See infra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.    
35  See MODEL RULES r. 3.3, 3.4 & 3.6. 
36  See id., r. 4.2 & 4.3. 
37  Id., r. 3.3. 
38  Id., r. 3.6. 
39  Id., r. 3.4. 
40  Zacharias, supra note 6, at 725–42. 
41  Id. at 726–28. 
42  See Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 
55 BROOK L. REV. 485 (1989); Samuel J. Levine, The Law and the “Spirit of the Law” in Legal 
Ethics, 2015 J. PROF. LAW. 1 (2015); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics 
Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 
TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003) [hereinafter Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously].   
43  See Green, supra note 32; Levine, supra note 32.  But see Samuel J. Levine, Judicial 
Rhetoric and Lawyers’ Roles, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1989 (2015) (cautioning against applying 
ethics rules in a way that prevents effective prosecution of deserving criminals). 
44  See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal 
Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000). 
2016] DISCIPLINARY REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS AS A REMEDY 
 
 
151 
other lawyers,45  but they give prosecutors more latitude than other lawyers to 
reward witnesses for testifying.46 
By and large, however, courts have refrained from interpreting ethics rules in 
a way that would demand more from prosecutors than from lawyers for private 
parties.  For example, ethics rules subject a lawyer to sanction for offering false 
evidence only if the lawyer knows the evidence is false.47  While the ABA’s non-
enforceable guidelines for prosecutors propose a higher standard, exhorting 
prosecutors to offer evidence only if they reasonably believe it to be true,48 courts 
have not interpreted ethics rules to align with this stricter normative expectation for 
prosecutors.  In short, the fact that comparatively few ethics rules apply to 
prosecutors’ work, coupled with courts’ general reluctance to interpret the 
applicable rules expansively in the context of prosecutorial ethics, may help 
explain why, as a descriptive matter, proportionately fewer prosecutors are 
publicly disciplined when compared with private practitioners.49  
The ABA has promulgated one ethics rule that is directed exclusively at 
prosecutors, Model Rule 3.8.  Most notably, Rule 3.8(d), which addresses 
prosecutors’ disclosure obligations, has been found by the ABA to demand more 
extensive and earlier disclosure than required under constitutional case law,50 and 
some courts have agreed.51  Moreover, the most recent additions, Rule 3.8(g) and 
(h), address prosecutors’ post-conviction obligations,52 giving substance to the duty 
to rectify wrongful convictions.53  Most prosecutors accept the basic premise of 
these new provisions, though some have raised objections to the wording of the 
provisions or to the concept that prosecutors’ post-conviction decisions, such as 
                                                                                                                            
 
45  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators 
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 75 & nn.34–36 (1995). 
46  See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that 
a prosecutor’s provision of leniency in exchange for testimony does not violate federal criminal law 
prohibiting compensating witnesses); see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 44, at 221 & n.89 
(citing cases rejecting argument that inducements to testify in plea bargaining might violate a federal 
bribery statute). 
47  MODEL RULES r. 3.3. 
48  ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.4(b) (4th ed. 
2015). 
49  Zacharias, supra note 6, at 743–65. 
50  ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (July 8, 2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2015/May/Conferen
ce/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.authcheckdam.pdf. 
51  See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethical Duty of Disclosure in Memory of Fred 
Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 57 (2011). 
52  See MODEL RULES r. 3.8(g)–(h). 
53  See, e.g., Warney v. Monroe Cty., 587 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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whether and how to investigate closed cases, should be subject to disciplinary 
oversight.54 
On the whole, however, Rule 3.8 addresses relatively few aspects of 
prosecutors’ work. 55   Even Rule 3.8(a), the only provision that regulates 
prosecutors’ charging decisions, 56  is essentially limited to restating the 
constitutional minimum,57 merely prohibiting prosecutors from pursuing charges 
that are not supported by probable cause.  Many commentators contend that, in 
their gate-keeping capacity, prosecutors should employ a more demanding 
standard, and many prosecutors agree.58  However, the language of Rule 3.8(a) not 
only leaves to prosecutors the apparently unfettered discretion to decline to bring 
charges or to seek to dismiss charges, for any reason at all—no matter how 
ostensibly arbitrary or biased—but also allows prosecutors to bring charges, no 
matter how unjust or unjustified, as long as the low probable-cause standard is 
satisfied. 
A few state judiciaries have revised or supplemented Rule 3.8(a) to further 
regulate prosecutors’ charging decisions.  In Washington D.C., Rule 3.8 provides 
that a prosecutor shall not “[i]n exercising discretion to investigate or to prosecute, 
improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any person,”59 or “[p]rosecute 
to trial a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence sufficient 
to establish a prima facie showing of guilt.”60  A recently enacted Massachusetts 
rule restricts prosecutors’ plea bargaining discretion, requiring a prosecutor to 
“refrain from seeking, as a condition of a disposition agreement in a criminal 
matter, the defendant’s waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or 
prosecutorial misconduct.” 61   These provisions might be viewed as modest 
additions to the respective state ethics codes and, even at that, they are exceptional.   
                                                                                                                            
 
54  See, e.g., sources cited in Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873 (2012); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009). 
55  See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573; 
Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 427 (2009); Levine, supra note 32. 
56  MODEL RULES r. 3.8(a) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from 
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”). 
57  See, e.g., Green, supra note 55, at 1588–89. 
58  See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the 
Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513 (1993); Green, supra note 55, at 1589 nn.78–81 
(citing sources). 
59  D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a). 
60   Id. r. 3.8(c). 
61  MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(h) (Mass. Court System 2016).  The new rule also 
includes a provision regulating prosecutors’ pretrial exercise of investigative discretion, providing 
that a prosecutor “shall . . . not avoid pursuit of evidence because the prosecutor believes it will 
damage the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.”  Id. r. 3.8(g). 
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While ethics rules may initially appear to leave much of prosecutors’ work 
unregulated, or to regulate prosecutors too leniently, it would be inaccurate to 
conclude, as a normative matter, that when courts condemn a prosecutor’s conduct 
as wrongful, ethics rules would rarely apply.  Several generally applicable rules, 
independently or taken together, can be—and, in some cases, have been—read to 
allow disciplinary responses to prosecutorial misconduct.  First, outright illegal 
conduct, such as prosecutors’ violations of discovery rules or court rules, can often 
be sanctioned under ethics rules that incorporate existing legal provisions. 62  
Second, a catch-all provision, prohibiting “conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice,” 63  allows for punishment not only for violations of 
existing law or rules, but also for other prosecutorial misconduct that violates 
judicial expectations, such that the conduct undermines the fairness of criminal 
proceedings.64  Third, a provision forbidding “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation” 65  provides a ground to discipline prosecutors for 
conduct directed at courts, defense lawyers, defendants, or witnesses that, although 
not involving an outright lie, entails deliberate deception.  Fourth, ethics rules hold 
lawyers, including prosecutors, accountable in some circumstances for misconduct 
committed by their subordinates or others with whom they work.66  Finally, the 
rule establishing lawyers’ duty to “provide competent representation”67 can be read 
to allow courts to punish prosecutors for some forms of wrongdoing, such as 
suppression of evidence that, although unintentional or unknowing, is committed 
through negligence.68  The competence rule might also be interpreted as a basis for 
sanctioning prosecutors for failing to take reasonable measures to ensure the 
truthfulness and reliability of their witnesses or for other failures to take reasonable 
care to avoid convicting innocent individuals.69 
It is unclear how far the existing rules can be extended to reach abuses of 
prosecutorial charging discretion in particular.70  One might infer that charging 
decisions are not subject to discipline as long as they satisfy the probable cause 
requirement of Rule 3.8(a).  However, aggressive or creative disciplinary 
                                                                                                                            
 
62  MODEL RULES r. 3.4(a)–(c). 
63  Id. r. 8.4(d); see Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 42, at 558–61. 
64  See, e.g., People v. Chambers, 154 P.3d 419 (Colo. 2006).  See also Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics 
Op. KBA E-435 (Nov. 17, 2012), 
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.kybar.org/resource/resmgr/Ethics_Opinions_(Part_2)_/kba_e-435.pdf. 
65  MODEL RULES r. 8.4(c).  
66  Id. r. 5.1 & 8.4(a).  Cf. In re McNally, 901 P.2d 415 (Alaska 1995).  
67  MODEL RULES r. 1.1. 
68  See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful 
Convictions:  A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L REV. 1 (2009). 
69  Id. 
70  See, e.g., MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6, at 75 (observing that “the majority of 
prosecutorial decisions are guided by prosecutors’ internal ethical compasses. . . .”).  
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authorities might address perceived abuses of discretionary authority under at least 
three other rules.  First, where the abusive charging decision appears to be 
improperly motivated by a prosecutor’s desire to advance a third party’s interests 
or the prosecutor’s own self-interest, a conflict of interest rule may apply.71  For 
example, prosecutors may be subject to discipline under conflict of interest rules 
for making charging decisions and otherwise participating in criminal cases where 
they have a past or present lawyer-client relationship, financial relationship or 
familial relationship with the putative defendant or victim.72  Conflict rules might 
also be invoked when prosecutors appear to be advancing less tangible interests, 
such as their own political self-interest.73  Second, where the prosecutor has an 
impermissible purpose for undertaking a prosecution, disciplinary authorities 
might proceed under Rule 4.4(a),74 which forbids a lawyer from using means on 
behalf of a client “that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, 
or burden a third person.”75  Finally, disciplinary authorities might invoke the 
“conduct that is prejudicial to justice” catch-all provision to address certain 
perceived abuses of prosecutorial discretion.76  Although the terms of this rule are 
                                                                                                                            
 
71  See MODEL RULES, r. 1.7, 1.9, 1.10 & 1.11.  
72  See, e.g., In re Ruffin, 54 So. 3d 645 (La. 2011) (suspending prosecutor for threatening 
criminal charges to help a friend collect on a bounced check); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. 
Rhodes, 453 N.W.2d 73 (Neb. 1990) (suspending prosecutor who cultivated relationship with 
defendant by dismissing minor charges and then attempting to coerce a relationship by threatening to 
file more serious ones).  Many of the disciplinary actions have been against part-time prosecutors for 
conflicts between their public responsibilities and their private practices.  See, e.g., In re Holste, 358 
P.3d 850 (Kan. 2015) (part-time prosecutor suspended for threatening criminal action to gain an 
advantage for a civil client); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Ballard, 349 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2011) (disciplining part-
time prosecutor for negotiating plea agreement with creditor client’s manager); In re Cole, 738 
N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. 2000) (disciplining part-time prosecutor for appearing as a prosecutor in cases 
involving private clients); In re Toups, 773 So. 2d 709 (La. 2000) (sanctioning part-time prosecutor 
for appearing as prosecutor against spouses of private divorce clients); In re Jones, PR 08-0216, slip 
op. at 1–2 (Mont. June 24, 2009); In re Thrush, 448 N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. 1983) (disciplining part-time 
prosecutor who failed to recuse himself in criminal case filed against a divorce client); Va. State Bar 
v. Gunter, 11 Va. Cir. 349 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1969) (reprimanding part-time prosecutor who filed bigamy 
charge against a man while representing the man’s wife in a divorce action).  See generally Richard 
H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 
KY. L.J. 1 (1992–93). 
73  See, e.g., In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, 73–75, 132–35, 137–38, 
217–18 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012), http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410Thomas-Aubuchon.PDF; In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bonet, 29 P.3d 1242 (Wash. 2001) (disciplining prosecutor for 
offering to dismiss criminal charges against a defendant in exchange for defendant’s agreement not 
testify on behalf of co-defendant). 
74  MODEL RULES r. 4.4(a). 
75  Id.; Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, 64–70, 136–37, 212–13. 
76  MODEL RULES r. 8.4(d).  See, e.g., Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, 83–87, 218; In re Ruffin, 54 
So. 3d 645 (La. 2011) (suspending prosecutor for threatening criminal charges to help a friend collect 
on a bounced check); Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 762 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 
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arguably somewhat vague, courts have imposed discipline for violations of broad 
ethics provisions, on the grounds that lawyers are generally expected to know what 
conduct is required of them.77 
 
III. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICS RULES AGAINST PROSECUTORS: 
A BRIEF DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
For more than a century, state courts have exercised disciplinary authority in 
response to instances of prosecutorial misconduct.78  In so doing, courts have, at 
times, expressly rejected both the argument that, as executive branch officials, state 
prosecutors should not be subject to judicial regulation,79 and the argument that, 
because of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal prosecutors cannot be 
regulated under state judicial discipline.80  That said, there is an overwhelming 
consensus of opinion that ethics rules are under-enforced against prosecutors.81  
Although studies show that state disciplinary authorities sometimes bring 
proceedings against prosecutors, typically for more egregious forms of 
misconduct,82 the perception, as Monroe Freedman observed fifteen years ago, is 
“that prosecutors are far too infrequently subjected to professional discipline and 
that courts cannot responsibly defer to disciplinary authorities to oversee 
prosecutorial misconduct that deprives individuals of fundamental rights.”83 
This perception arises, in part, out of the mismatch between reported 
wrongdoing and reports of disciplinary punishment.  Courts and scholars have 
identified a wide array of prosecutorial misconduct that violates a variety of 
                                                                                                                            
2009) (suspending prosecutor for forgoing prosecutions in exchange for contributions to sheriff’s 
fund). 
77  See, e.g., Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988).  See generally 
Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, supra note 42. 
78  See infra Part IV. 
79  See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317 (Conn. 1995).  See 
infra Part IV. 
80  See, e.g., In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997).  This argument seems to have been put 
to rest by the Citizens Protection Act, popularly known as the McDade Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 
530B.  See generally Zacharias & Green, supra note 44, at 211–24 (discussing history and effect of 
Act); Hopi Costello, Note, Judicial Interpretation of State Ethics Rules Under the McDade 
Amendment: Do Federal or State Courts Get the Last Word?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 236 (2015). 
81  See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 10, at 161; Green, supra note 54; Meares, supra note 17; Joel 
B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or 
the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove That Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM. L. REV. 537 (2011); 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 9; Brooke Williams & Shawn Musgrave, Wayward Prosecutors Go 
Unpunished as Prison Time for Victims Piles Up, THE EYE (Apr. 3, 2016), 
http://eye.necir.org/2016/04/03/wayward-prosecutors-go-unpunished-prison-time-victims-piles/.  
82  See MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6.  See infra Part IV.  
83  Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor 
Zacharias, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121, 122 (2001). 
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disciplinary rules.84  For example, courts have documented numerous violations of 
prosecutors’ discovery obligations, which defense lawyers and some courts assume 
to be the tip of the iceberg.85  Courts have identified frequent improprieties in 
prosecutors’ jury arguments, typically finding that the improprieties were 
“harmless error.” 86   Prosecutors have been found to commit various other 
improprieties, both in and out of court.87  In contrast, studies suggest, prosecutors 
have relatively rarely faced public discipline.  In a 2001 article, Fred Zacharias 
concluded that over the course of more than a century, prosecutors had been 
publicly disciplined for professional misconduct around 100 times, with the largest 
category of cases involving blatantly illegal conduct such as bribery, extortion, or 
embezzlement. 88   More recent studies have found that the problem persists. 89  
                                                                                                                            
 
84  Bennett Gershman has been chronicling prosecutorial misconduct for more than three 
decades.  See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1988). 
85  See, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the 
land.  Only judges can put a stop to it.”).  See generally Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions 
Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) 
(concluding from reported decisions that prosecutors frequently withhold exculpatory evidence and 
present false evidence); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement 
of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833 (1997).   
86  See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); United States v. Modica, 663 
F.2d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1981) (describing “situation with which this Court is all too familiar: a 
prosecutor has delivered an improper summation, despite this Court’s oft-expressed concern over the 
frequency with which improper prosecution summations occur”); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“At times it seems as if certain counsel consider the harmless and 
fundamental error rules to be a license to violate both the substantive law and the ethical rules that 
prohibit improper argument.”); id. at 897 (Altenbernd, A.C.J., concurring) (“There are about a dozen 
bad tactics that this court sees with regularity in closing arguments.”).  
87  See generally GERSHMAN, supra note 84.   
88  Zacharias, supra note 6, at 744–46.  See also Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct 
by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 670–71 (1972) (finding only one reported 
instance of a prosecutor being disciplined for courtroom misconduct); CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, 
HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/harmful-error. 
89  See, e.g., David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. 
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203 (2011); KATHLEEN RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE 
ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009 (Oct. 2010), 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncippubs; see also PROJ. 
ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, HUNDREDS OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ATTORNEYS VIOLATED PROFESSIONAL 
RULES, LAWS, OR ETHICAL STANDARDS (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.pogo.org/our-
work/reports/2014/hundreds-of-justice-attorneys-violated-standards.html; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, https://www.aclu.org/issues/capital-
punishment/prosecutorial-misconduct-and-capital-punishment?redirect=blog/tag/prosecutorial-
misconduct.   
It should be noted that studies are ordinarily limited to reported disciplinary decisions.  In some 
jurisdictions, lawyers are subject to private sanctions—e.g., private reprimands—and studies do not 
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Moreover, judicial decisions finding that prosecutors engaged in misconduct may 
understate the extent of the problem, since there are many cases where courts 
simply decline to adjudicate claims of misconduct, others where defense lawyers 
perceive misconduct but do not file a complaint, and still others where misconduct 
is not visible to the defense or the court. 
Of course, it is not surprising that disciplinary agencies sometimes decline to 
pursue prosecutorial misconduct.  In general, ethics rules, like criminal laws, are 
enforced selectively, both because of limited resources and out of a sense of 
proportionality.  Understandably, disciplinary authorities do not demand 
perfection, but instead pursue the most blameworthy lawyers and the most serious 
wrongdoing.  Many violations of advocacy rules, whether committed by 
prosecutors or by other lawyers, do not seem to warrant formal discipline.  For 
example, it is not unusual for prosecutors, defense lawyers, and civil lawyers alike 
to unknowingly make impermissible jury arguments or withhold discoverable 
evidence, based on either an aggressive reading of the law or a misunderstanding 
of the applicable standards.  In many such scenarios, and even in some cases of 
minor, albeit intentional, wrongdoing, courts adequately address the misconduct, 
often informally, at the time it is discovered.90  Thus, one might reasonably expect 
and accept that disciplinary proceedings will be limited to instances of misconduct 
that are intentional, recurring, and/or extremely prejudicial.  The problem, 
however, is that disciplinary authorities have appeared to ignore even serious 
prosecutorial wrongdoing, as long as the conduct falls short of criminal law 
breaking.  
This situation may appear to be changing.  In 2007, elected District Attorney 
Mike Nifong of Durham, North Carolina, was disbarred for misconduct in the 
course of a nationally publicized sex-crime prosecution of Duke University 
lacrosse players who, it turned out, were innocent.91  Nifong’s misconduct included 
making false statements, withholding exculpatory evidence, and making 
impermissible statements to the press. 92   Though at the time, some viewed 
                                                                                                                            
capture unreported cases, if any, in which prosecutors were privately reprimanded for misconduct.  
That said, there is nothing to suggest that in jurisdictions that allow for private disciplinary sanctions, 
prosecutors are sanctioned privately with any degree of frequency.    
90  See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Ward, 353 P.3d 509, 521–22 (Okla. 2015) (citing 
In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1173 (Colo. 2002)) (maintaining that discovery violations should be 
handled by the trial court). 
91  See, e.g., WILLIAM D. COHAN, THE PRICE OF SILENCE: THE DUKE LACROSSE SCANDAL, THE 
POWER OF THE ELITE, AND THE CORRUPTION OF OUR GREAT UNIVERSITIES (2014); STUART TAYLOR JR. 
& KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES 
OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007).  
92  Amended Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 22–24, N.C. 
State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35, Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar (July 24, 
2007), http://www.ncbar.gov/Nifong%20Final%20Order.pdf; Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke 
Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1346, 1348, 1358 (2007). 
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Nifong’s disbarment as an aberration,93 there has been a more recent string of 
disciplinary cases against even more powerful and higher-ranking elected 
prosecutors.  In 2012, Andrew Thomas, who had been a candidate for state 
Attorney General two years earlier, was disbarred for misconduct committed while 
serving as the elected prosecutor of Maricopa County in Phoenix, Arizona.94  In 
2013, Phil Kline was indefinitely suspended from practicing law for misconduct 
committed while serving first as state Attorney General and then as the prosecutor 
of Kansas’s most populous county.95  And in 2015, Kathleen Kane, the Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania, was suspended from law practice on a temporary 
emergency basis, pending criminal charges that she improperly leaked grand jury 
information and then lied about her conduct.96  While each case involves unusual 
and egregious misconduct, and accordingly might be deemed, individually, as 
aberrational and therefore of limited significance, together these cases suggest that 
courts and disciplinary authorities in the past decade have become less reluctant to 
pursue professional discipline of prosecutors who engage in professional 
improprieties.   
Perhaps more notably, these disciplinary proceedings against elected 
prosecutors appear to have been animated, to varying degrees, by concerns about 
the abuse of discretionary power.  In Nifong’s case, what most disturbed the 
public—and, no doubt, the disciplinary authorities as well—was that he abused his 
power by continuing the prosecution after the evidence discredited the complaining 
witness and strongly suggested that the defendants were innocent.97  Although 
Nifong’s failure to drop the charges at that point was not the official ground for 
                                                                                                                            
 
93  See Davis, supra note 9, at 296–303; David Feige, One-Off Offing, SLATE (June 18, 2007, 
6:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/06/oneoff_offing.html 
(“Prosecutors almost never face public censure or disbarment for their actions. . . .  Regardless of 
Nifong’s sanction, the drama leaves prosecutorial misconduct commonplace, unseen, uncorrected, 
and unpunished.”); Zacharias & Green, supra note 68, at 12. 
94  In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410Thomas-Aubuchon.PDF.  Disciplinary charges were also 
brought against one of his top deputies and a more junior lawyer.  The top deputy was disbarred.  In 
re Aubuchon, 309 P.3d 886 (Ariz. 2013).  The junior lawyer, who had a minor role, was suspended 
for six months.  In re Alexander, 300 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2012).  
95  In re Kline, 311 P.3d 321 (Kan. 2013). 
96  Order, Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kane, No. 2202 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 (Pa. 
Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/2202DD3%20-
%201023669815398023.pdf.  See also Petition for Emergency Temporary Suspension, Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kane, No. 2202 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 (Pa. Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-4359/file-4699.pdf?cb=5263db [hereinafter Petition].  For 
earlier cases of high-ranking prosecutors disciplined for criminal conduct, see, for example, Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Preate, 731 A.2d 129 (Pa. 1999); Mitchell v. Ass’n of the Bar, 351 N.E.2d 
743 (N.Y. 1976). 
97  See Feige, supra note 93 (observing that “if the Duke case had gone to a jury and the 
defendants had been convicted, Nifong would not only still have his law license—he’d have been 
lionized for his dogged pursuit of rich white kids”). 
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discipline, the perception that Nifong abused his charging power probably 
influenced both the aggressiveness of the disciplinary prosecution and the 
seriousness of the eventual sanction.  As Angela Davis noted, most of the charges 
leading to Nifong’s disbarment—other than those regarding his false statements—
involved conduct that does not ordinarily catch disciplinary authorities’ attention.98  
For example, Nifong was sanctioned in part for misusing the press, even though 
prosecutors usually receive nothing worse than a judicial tongue-lashing for 
improprieties in press conferences.99  Nifong’s disbarment was also grounded on 
his failure to make timely pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence, conduct that 
rarely results in discipline.100 
In the disciplinary proceedings against former Maricopa County Attorney 
Andrew Thomas, the abuse of charging power was not only central to the 
disciplinary charges but also provided one of the principal grounds for his 
disbarment.101  In brief, Thomas led his office to battle against members of the 
Board of Supervisors, with whom he disagreed over whether the Board could 
retain outside counsel rather than being represented by Thomas’s office or his 
appointees.  Among other indiscretions, he investigated and brought criminal 
charges, most of which were time-barred, against his principal political nemesis, 
the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, and later re-indicted the Chairman and 
indicted a second Supervisor.  Then, to forestall a hearing into a motion brought to 
curtail his investigative efforts, Thomas filed criminal charges against the judge 
assigned to conduct the hearing, compelling the judge’s recusal.  The disciplinary 
panel found that the charges against the judge were entirely baseless, and that even 
if the charges against the Supervisors were factually supported, it was improper for 
Thomas to bring them. 
The Arizona disciplinary authorities employed, and the disciplinary panel 
upheld, an unconventional theory to sanction Thomas for abusing his charging 
power in proceeding against the two Supervisors.  Specifically, the panel 
concluded that even if a prosecution was supported by probable cause, a 
disciplinary panel can look to the prosecutor’s subjective motivations and impose 
discipline when the prosecutor’s reason for bringing criminal charges was to serve 
his self-interest or to serve some other illegitimate purpose.102  Applied to Thomas, 
                                                                                                                            
 
98  See Davis, supra note 9, at 297–99. 
99  See Abigail H. Lipman, Note, Extrajudicial Comments and the Special Responsibilities of 
Prosecutors: Failings of the Model Rules in Today’s Media Age, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1537–
41 (2010).     
100  See Freedman, supra note 83.   
101  The disciplinary panel’s opinion reviewing 33 charges against Thomas and two of his top 
aides spans more than 200 pages and more than 500 paragraphs, but the story is well-summarized by 
the concurring opinion of the panel’s non-lawyer member.  See In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, 
PDJ-2011-9002, 233–246 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012), http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410Thomas-
Aubuchon.PDF. 
102 See id. at 69. 
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the panel found, first, that his principal purposes for prosecuting the Supervisors 
were improper, i.e., to exact “political revenge,” 103  and second, that he had a 
conflict of interest arising out of his “personal animosity.”104  Nevertheless, the 
hearing panel regarded Thomas’s misconduct as aberrational—like that of Mike 
Nifong, to whom Thomas’s disciplinary hearing panel alluded in its report105—and 
it predicted that “its ruling will offer little insight or guidance for other 
prosecutors,” who would be “shocked by [Thomas’s] methods and actions.”106  
Thus, the panel downplayed both the significance of the legal theory upon which it 
sanctioned Thomas’s abuses of charging discretion, and the potential applicability 
of that theory to future cases in which prosecutors undertake a personal or political 
vendetta. 
In Kline’s case, the alleged misconduct related to his criminal investigation of 
abortion providers “spanning a period of nearly [six] years with prosecutorial 
proceedings before six separate courts.”107   He was sanctioned principally for 
dishonesty and lack of candor in various proceedings, and for allowing sealed 
documents to be attached to a public filing.  None of the disciplinary charges 
(some of which were found to be unsubstantiated) expressly targeted Kline’s abuse 
of discretion in crusading against abortion providers, and the court steered clear of 
criticizing Kline for overzealousness and misdirecting his office’s resources.  Nor 
did the opinion make the obvious point that, while prosecutors are expected to 
promote public safety and order, Kline exploited the criminal process in a political 
vendetta that stoked public outrage and violence.  The State Supreme Court’s 
lengthy opinion recounted that Kline’s investigation of Dr. George Tiller led to Dr. 
Tiller’s indictment, trial, and acquittal,108 but the opinion failed to add that Dr. 
Tiller was assassinated a few months later.109  Only at the end of the opinion, 
where it alluded to Kline’s “fervid belief or desire to see his cause succeed,”110 did 
the court even obliquely suggest that Kline’s wrongs included the misdirection of 
prosecutorial power in a personal, political crusade.  Perhaps the disciplinary 
authorities and the court were indifferent to this concern—or rather, perhaps they 
were tacitly influenced by it. 
Finally, the disciplinary charges against Attorney General Kane related to her 
abuse of prosecutorial power, following her indictment for intentionally disclosing 
                                                                                                                            
 
103 Id. at 68. 
104 Id. at 73–74. 
105 See id. at 11–12. 
106 Id. at 22.   
107 In re Kline, 311 P.3d 321, 328 (Kan. 2013). 
108 See id. at 336. 
109 See Joe Stumpe & Monica Davey, Abortion Doctor Shot to Death in Kansas Church, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/us/01tiller.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
110 Kline, 311 P.3d at 395.  
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secret grand jury information.  The disciplinary board’s petition alleged that after 
taking office, Kane questioned her predecessor’s handling of a 2009 grand jury 
probe into the alleged misuse of state funds.  One of the subjects of the earlier 
investigation was a current member of a state commission who, at the time of the 
2009 grand jury probe, headed a local NAACP chapter.  Recognizing that it was 
impossible to reverse her predecessor’s earlier decision not to indict the 
commissioner, Kane authorized her office to publish a report describing the 
evidence before the grand jury, allegedly for no legitimate purpose but solely to 
embarrass him.111 
These recent examples do not necessarily signal that, as a general matter, 
disciplinary authorities are becoming more aggressive in pursuing prosecutorial 
misconduct.  After all, these few cases involved extreme and public misconduct by 
high-ranking public officials, with perhaps limited implications for how 
disciplinary authorities will deal with less egregious wrongdoing by subordinate 
prosecutors in cases that escape public attention.  
There are, however, some additional signs that, more generally, disciplinary 
authorities may be taking prosecutorial misconduct more seriously.  Although the 
number of disciplinary cases still remains small compared with the incidence of 
perceived wrongdoing, it seems that more disciplinary proceedings were brought 
against prosecutors in the past decade than in previous years.112  Importantly, some 
of these cases involved prosecutorial misconduct that courts may have considered 
fairly low-level.113  While many courts still appear to punish prosecutors lightly 
when wrongdoing is found, 114  others regard prosecutorial misconduct as 
particularly deserving of punishment because it entails a breach of public trust.115  
                                                                                                                            
 
111 See Petition, supra note 96.  In In re Russell, 797 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 2011), a young elected 
prosecutor who pursued a criminal case “to enhance and defend his political career,” id. at 90, misled 
a judge to secure the improper release of grand jury transcripts in “an effort to protect his personal 
reputation from increasing public criticism.”  Id. at 89.  The court imposed a public censure, 
attributing the prosecutor’s misconduct largely to inexperience.  Id. at 91.  Kane was convicted of 
criminal conduct and recently sentenced.  See Associated Press, Former Pennsylvania Attorney 
General Sentenced in Perjury Case, POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/kathleen-kane-sentence-perjury-pennsylvania-attorney-
general-230252. 
112 See, e.g., cases cited infra, notes 113–19.  It should be noted that research into disciplinary 
decisions is difficult, and generalizations about frequency may miss the mark because not all 
disciplinary decisions are available through Westlaw and LEXIS.  In particular, some decisions are 
posted on judicial websites but not publicly reported.  Therefore, they are not easily located.  In 
addition, some disciplinary decisions, particularly those involving low-level sanctions, may possibly 
be found only in court files, and not posted electronically.  An effort is underway on the website, 
www.prosecutorialaccountability.com, to identify reports of prosecutorial discipline, but the website 
is not comprehensive. 
113 See, e.g., In re Black, 156 P.3d 641 (Kan. 2007) (publicly censuring prosecutor for 
mishandling funds). 
114 See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Phillabaum, 144 Ohio St.3d 417, 2015-Ohio-4346 (Ohio 
2015) (one-year suspension for prosecutor who was convicted of falsifying a grand jury indictment); 
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As another sign of increased and more serious attention to prosecutorial 
misconduct, disciplinary authorities have sometimes brought proceedings even 
when the scope of the applicable disciplinary rules was uncertain.  In particular, 
proceedings have been brought when prosecutors withheld favorable evidence that, 
in hindsight, was not material to the outcome of the trial, and thus its suppression 
was not a violation of constitutional obligations under Brady v. Maryland.  Two of 
the disciplinary cases were brought against federal prosecutors, and incurred the 
opposition of the U.S. Department of Justice,116 while others were brought against 
local prosecutors.117  In some cases, courts adopted the disciplinary authorities’ 
reading of Rule 3.8(d), 118  demanding broader disclosure than required under 
                                                                                                                            
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 360 P.3d 508 (Okla. 2015) (reprimanding two prosecutors for 
lack of candor); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Layton, 324 P.3d 1244 (Okla. 2014) (finding that 
under the circumstances the prosecutor’s lack of candor did not merit any discipline); State ex rel. 
Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108, 120 (Okla. 2013) (terming prosecutor’s suppression of 
evidence in a murder case “reprehensible,” but imposing only a 180-day suspension largely because 
the misconduct occurred decades earlier); In re Att’y F, 285 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2012) (en banc) 
(remanding for consideration of whether a private reprimand, rather than a public censure, is the 
appropriate sanction for lying to defense counsel); In re Humphrey, 811 N.W.2d 363, 375 (Wis. 
2012) (imposing 30-day suspension for misleading trial judge); In re Kohler, 762 N.W.2d 377 (Wis. 
2009) (publicly reprimanding prosecutor who disobeyed a court order, withheld discovery and lied to 
the judge); In re Williams, 663 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 2008) (imposing six-month suspension of assistant 
prosecutor following his misdemeanor conviction for assisting the elected prosecutor in 
misappropriating County funds).  But see State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Wintory, 350 P.3d 131 
(Okla. 2015) (suspending Arizona prosecutor for two years for lack of candor, after the Arizona court 
suspended him for only 90 days for the same conduct); In re Smith, 29 So. 2d 1232 (La. 2010) 
(suspending lawyer for briefly moonlighting as criminal defense lawyer after becoming a prosecutor). 
115 See, e.g., In re Howes, 39 A.3d 1, 18 (D.C. 2012) (disbarring federal prosecutor for 
misusing witness funds and making false statements in connection with witness vouchers, and noting 
that his “role as a prosecutor heightens the need for deterrence and the potential for harm to the 
public as a result of his misconduct”); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Busch, 754 S.E.2d 729, 742 (W. 
Va. 2014) (imposing three-year suspension for violation of discovery rule and other misconduct, in 
light of the importance of public trust in public officials).  
Many of these disciplinary cases have escaped notice, particularly among the press and the 
public.  Indeed, it seems the national media pays attention only when a prosecutor is disciplined for 
misconduct in a high-profile case.  There was much media coverage when former elected Texas 
prosecutor Charles Sebesta was disbarred in 2015 for wrongdoing that contributed to the wrongful 
murder conviction of Anthony Graves, who spent more than 18 years on death row.  Likewise, 
attention was paid in 2013 when former Texas prosecutor Ken Anderson was disbarred for 
misconduct contributing to the wrongful murder conviction of Michael Morton, who spent 25 years 
in prison before being exonerated.   
116 Brief and Appendices of Amicus Curiae U.S. in Support of Respondent Andrew J. Kline, In 
re Kline, Bd. Docket No. 11-BD-007 (D.C. June 7, 2012), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/usa-
amicus-kline-1.pdf; Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee Jeffrey Auerhahn and 
Affirmance, In re Auerhahn, No. 11-2206, No. 1:09-MC-10206-RWZ-WGY-GAO (1st Cir. July 23, 
2012), 2012 WL 2871540. 
117 See, e.g., In re Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672 (N.D. 2012); Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-
Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 2010). 
118 See, e.g., In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202 (D.C. 2015) (adopting ABA interpretation); In re 
Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672.  See generally Green, supra note 45. 
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constitutional precedent, and in other cases, they rejected it.119  In Massachusetts, 
after the federal court read the rule narrowly,120 the state judiciary amended the 
rule to clarify that it embodied ethical obligations beyond the contours of the 
constitutional requirements.121  Disciplinary authorities’ willingness to proceed on 
a contested legal theory, particularly in the face of anticipated government 
opposition, seems significant, defying expectations that disciplinary proceedings 
will be initiated only when prosecutors’ misconduct is beyond dispute.  
It is unlikely that professional discipline will ever be a complete answer to all 
of the problems, real and perceived, of prosecutorial misconduct.  The defense bar, 
reform organizations, and other vocal critics of prosecutorial abuse of power 
increasingly view prosecutorial misconduct as a systemic problem, and therefore 
they advocate for systemic reforms as an alternative preferable to enhanced 
disciplinary enforcement.122  Still, one might anticipate that, as public and judicial 
concerns continue to grow over prosecutorial misconduct, discipline will play an 
increasingly significant role when prosecutors plainly violate established law and 
ethics rules governing their conduct as trial lawyers.  A more difficult question, 
addressed in Part IV, is whether ethics rules can and should be expanded, 
interpreted more liberally, or applied more creatively, to regulate a category of 
conduct that is often regarded as troubling but is insufficiently addressed by other 
means: namely, abuses of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
IV. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR ABUSES OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION:  
A HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
In recent years, prosecutors have faced increasing accusations not only of 
violating specific legal and ethical obligations, such as the duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence,123 but also of generally abusing their authority, including 
their broad discretion to decide whether to bring criminal charges and what charges 
to bring.124  For example, not-for-profit organizations, media representatives, and 
members of the public criticized the elected prosecutor in Ferguson for failing to 
press for an indictment of a police officer responsible for killing an unarmed 
                                                                                                                            
 
119 See, e.g., In re Auerhahn, 724 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2013); Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125 
(holding that materiality is required under disciplinary rule); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Ward, 
353 P.3d 509 (Okla. 2015) (holding that materiality is required under disciplinary rule). 
120 In re Auerhahn, 724 F.3d 103. 
121 See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) cmt. 3A (2016). 
122 See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxvi-xxxii.  See generally Bruce A. Green & Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
123 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text. 
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civilian, Michael Brown.125   The U.S. Department of Justice reported that the 
Missoula County Attorney’s Office failed to adequately prosecute sexual assault 
cases.126  Congressional committees launched investigations into accusations that 
federal prosecutors were under-zealous in investigating alleged improprieties by 
I.R.S. officials,127 and that federal prosecutors overcharged internet “hacktivist” 
Aaron Swartz, driving him to suicide.128 
As a threshold matter, it seems clear that prosecutors should generally be 
subject to professional sanction when they deliberately violate established 
constitutional and other legal standards regarding discovery, closing arguments, 
and other aspects of professional conduct, in and out of court.129  Discipline plays 
an important role in promoting lawful conduct and in protecting the public from 
prosecutors who deliberately act unlawfully.  For similar reasons, prosecutors 
should be subject to discipline when they violate the law through gross or repeated 
negligence. 
It is less clear, however, whether courts can and should sanction prosecutors 
for abuses of discretionary charging power.  Most areas of charging and plea-
bargaining decisions are only lightly governed by enforceable law. 130   When 
                                                                                                                            
 
125 See Letter from Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Dir.-Counsel, NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, to 
Hon. Maura McShane, 21st Judicial Circuit, St. Louis County Court (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/251842888/NAACP-LDF-Open-Letter-to-Judge-Maura-McShane; Nadia 
Prupis, Ferguson Prosecutor Hit With Ethics Complaint, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/01/06/ferguson-prosecutor-hit-ethics-complaint.  A suit 
seeking to remove the prosecutor from office was denied.  See Dismissal of Suit Seeking Removal of 
McCulloch, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 6, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/dismissal-of-suit-
seeking-removal-of-mcculloch/pdf_76d7eb63-b522-5371-b52d-2589910e5757.html. 
126 See Letter from Michael W. Cotter, U.S. Att’y, Dist. of Mont. to Fred Van Valkenburg, Cty 
Att’y, Missoula County, Mont. (Feb. 14, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/02/19/missoula_ltr_2-14-14.pdf. 
127 See S. REP. No. 114-119, pt. 1 (2015).  
128 See Brian Fung & Andrea Peterson, After Long Delay, Obama Declines to Rule on Petition 
Calling for Firing of DOJ Officials Over Aaron Swartz’s Suicide, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Jan. 8, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/08/in-a-long-delayed-petition-
response-obama-refuses-to-fire-u-s-attorneys-over-aaron-swartz/; Zach Carter, Al Franken Sends Eric 
Holder Letter Over ‘Remarkably Aggressive’ Aaron Swartz Prosecution, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 
2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/22/al-franken-eric-holder_n_2934627.html; 
Zach Carter, John Cornyn Criticizes Eric Holder Over Aaron Swartz’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 18, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/18/john-cornyn-eric-holder-aaron-
swartz_n_2505528.html; see also Lincoln Caplan, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. 
TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:06 AM), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/aaron-swartz-and-prosecutorial-discretion/ (accusing 
prosecutors of overcharging); Stephen L. Carter, The Overzealous Prosecution of Aaron Swartz, 
BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
01-17/the-overzealous-prosecution-of-aaron-swartz.html. 
129 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
130 See Podgor, supra note 19; Poulin, supra note 19.    
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prosecutors exercise charging power in violation of constitutional or statutory 
law—for example, when they initiate charges without probable cause or selectively 
prosecute in violation of constitutional norms—one might assume that they should 
be subject to personal discipline.  But most charging decisions that critics regard as 
excessively lenient, excessively harsh, arbitrary, or otherwise abusive are generally 
thought to be within the broad scope of prosecutorial discretion, unregulated by 
any established legal restrictions.131  Indeed, even when critical of prosecutors’ 
exercise of charging discretion, judges ordinarily do not review and supersede 
prosecutors’ charging decisions.132  As a result, courts have not developed a robust 
jurisprudence establishing when prosecutors abuse their discretionary power.  
Likewise, courts and commentators have not deeply analyzed the extent to which 
professional discipline may be meted out for abuses of charging discretion. 
As discussed in Part III, courts conceivably have the ability to establish 
independent disciplinary standards governing the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, either by liberally interpreting current ethics rules or by adopting new 
rules.  The question is whether doing so is within judicial authority under state 
constitutional law.  On one hand, state courts have general authority to discipline 
prosecutors for professional misconduct, including constitutional violations. 133  
Moreover, it is generally accepted that courts have supervisory authority to adopt 
and apply ethics rules that go beyond existing constitutional and statutory law, 
regulating the conduct of trial lawyers, including prosecutors, in their dealings with 
the courts and other parties.134  On the other hand, given the apparent limits on 
adjudicatory review of charging decisions, it is less certain that state courts have 
                                                                                                                            
 
131 See supra notes 12–20 and accompanying text.  See also United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 
955 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended on denial of reh’g) (“Our only available course is to 
deny the defendant a judicial remedy for what may be a violation of a constitutional right—not to 
have charging or plea bargaining decisions made in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”). 
132 See infra notes 133–46 and accompanying text; Soares v. Carter, 32 N.E.3d 390, 392 (N.Y. 
2015) (citations omitted) (“Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts lack the authority to 
compel the prosecution of criminal actions. Such a right is solely within the broad authority and 
discretion of the district attorney’s executive power to conduct all phases of criminal prosecution.”). 
133 See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988) (noting that 
prosecutors can be disciplined for misconduct in the grand jury); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 
499, 506 n.5 (1983) (noting availability of professional discipline for improper jury argument that, in 
the context of the case, was harmless error); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976) 
(upholding prosecutorial immunity from civil liability for using false evidence and withholding 
exculpatory evidence, but noting that prosecutors are subject to discipline for violating constitutional 
rights). 
134 For example, state rules based on ABA Model Rule 4.2, restricting lawyers’ 
communications with represented persons, have been held to apply to prosecutors, notwithstanding 
that the rules are more restrictive than the Constitution.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 
1032 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997); In re Brey, 490 N.W.2d 15 (Wis. 
1992).  See generally Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal 
Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 
(1992). 
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the authority to establish and enforce disciplinary standards for abuses of 
prosecutors’ charging discretion.  The absence of a robust disciplinary 
jurisprudence regarding abuses of prosecutorial discretion may simply reflect state 
courts’ traditional reluctance to police prosecutors, but it may also reflect state 
courts’ doubts about the scope of their own authority to enforce standards 
governing prosecutors’ charging decisions in particular.  
This Part examines the assumption, largely influenced by federal case law, 
that state courts lack the authority or ability to employ the disciplinary process to 
regulate prosecutors’ charging decisions.135   It focuses on two questions: first, 
whether the separation-of-powers considerations that restrain federal courts in 
adjudication should similarly discourage state courts from undertaking disciplinary 
inquiries into prosecutors’ decision making; and second, assuming such inquiries 
may be undertaken, whether state courts, pursuant to their power to adopt ethics 
rules, may apply their own standards governing prosecutors’ decision making or 
are limited to enforcing constitutional and statutory standards. 
 
A. State Court Disciplinary Review of Prosecutorial Decision Making 
 
It is often assumed, based on the federal court model, that courts have 
minimal authority to review prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining decisions 
and other discretionary decisions.136  The federal constitutional case law sets a high 
bar to a criminal defendant who claims to have been charged selectively, 
vindictively, or discriminatorily in violation of the Constitution, 137  and the 
constitution affords no judicial review at all of a prosecutor’s decision to refrain 
from filing a criminal charge when victims or members of the public believe that 
prosecutors have not lived up to their responsibilities.138   Federal courts have 
limited statutory authority to oversee certain discretionary decisions, such as a 
prosecutor’s decision to dismiss charges after they have been filed,139 and some 
federal courts regard this authority as meaningful, 140  but most federal courts 
remain highly deferential to prosecutors’ charging decisions.141 
                                                                                                                            
 
135 See Barkow, supra note 12. 
136 See, e.g., United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended on 
denial of reh’g); see also Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016), 1234–39 nn.19–43 and accompanying text (citing U.S. Supreme Court 
and other federal court cases). 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 
21 (1974). 
138 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). 
139 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an 
indictment, information, or complaint.” (emphasis added)). 
140 See United States v. Abreu, 747 F. Supp. 493, 502 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (“[I]t seems altogether 
proper to say the phrase ‘by leave of court’ in Rule 48(a) was intended to modify and condition the 
absolute power of the executive, consistently with the framers’ concept of separation of powers, by 
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The premise of prosecutorial discretion is that once there is sufficient 
evidence to support criminal charges, a variety of public policy considerations go 
into the determination of whether the public interest is served by bringing or 
pursuing a criminal case,142 and that prosecutors are best positioned to make this 
judgment. 143   Courts recognize the potential for prosecutors to abuse their 
discretion; at times, for example, prosecutors exercise discretion not just unwisely, 
but arbitrarily or in bad faith.144  The appropriate remedy, however, may be found 
in the political, rather than the judicial, process. 145 
If, indeed, courts are unable to meaningfully remedy prosecutors’ abuses of 
charging and plea bargaining discretion in criminal cases over which they preside, 
it might follow that courts likewise do not have the ability to punish prosecutors’ 
abuses of discretion through the after-the-fact disciplinary process.  Presumably, 
the justifications for judicial deference to prosecutors’ discretionary decisions 
apply just as strongly in the disciplinary context as in criminal adjudication. 
Courts and scholars have identified various reasons that, both as a matter of 
constitutional separation of powers and as a matter of prudence, federal courts only 
lightly review prosecutors’ discretionary decisions. 146   As executive branch 
                                                                                                                            
erecting a check on the abuse of executive prerogatives.”); United States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. 
851, 856 (D. Utah 1989) (“Rather than the court’s action constituting a usurpation of the Executive 
power and interference with prosecutorial discretion . . . in this court’s view the narrow interpretation 
of ‘leave of court’ as advocated in the Joint Motion and applied in this case would constitute violation 
of principles of separation of powers because of interference with judicial discretion.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
141 See Barkow, supra note 22, at 872 (“[F]ederal judges continue to rubber stamp cooperation, 
charging, and plea decisions.”).  See, e.g., United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 743 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[C]onstrue the ‘approval of the court’ language in [18 U.S.C.] § 3161(h)(2) in a 
manner that preserves the Executive’s long-settled primacy over charging decisions and that denies 
courts substantial power to impose their own charging preferences.”). 
142 See, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d 
ed. 1993). 
143 See, e.g., Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
144 See, e.g., State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wallach, 182 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1944). 
145 See, e.g., Editorial, Voters Tell D.A.s, Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2016, at 
A26 (veteran prosecutors in Cleveland and Chicago were denied renomination in Democratic 
primaries for mishandling cases of police shootings of civilians). 
146 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 970–71 (citing various rationales courts have invoked for 
the deferential approach to reviewing prosecutors’ charging decisions, including judges’ views that 
“they are less competent to weigh all the relevant factors,” the concern that “revealing prosecutorial 
information could ‘chill law enforcement . . . [and] undermine prosecutorial effectiveness’” and case 
law holding that “[t]he separation of powers . . . forbids judicial interference with prosecutorial 
discretion to decline to file charges”); id. at 973 (“Judicially enforceable models of equality are 
poorly suited to balance the myriad practical and policy considerations that prosecutors legitimately 
take into account.”); Davis, supra note 13, at 408–15 (citing various ways the law insulates 
prosecutors’ abuse of discretion from effective judicial review, including the harmless error doctrine, 
obstacles to discovery, civil immunity, and a general reluctance among courts to exercise their 
supervisory power out of concern for the separation of powers); Podgor, supra note 19, at 463; 
Poulin, supra note 19, at 1119; Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1546 (“Courts often justify their refusal 
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officials, prosecutors, not courts, are generally entrusted with charging authority, 
and the review of those decisions would entangle courts in core executive decision-
making.147  In addition, courts arguably have no greater expertise than prosecutors 
in determining how to identify and balance relevant public policy considerations 
that bear on charging decisions.148  Relatedly, prosecutors have greater access to 
the facts relevant to charging decisions—both the facts of the particular case and 
general background facts.149   As a result, judicial fact-finding would be time-
consuming and duplicative, and would potentially intrude on the confidentiality of 
particular criminal investigations and the general workings of the prosecutor’s 
office.150 
To the extent these considerations are compelling in the context of criminal 
adjudication, they would seem likewise to weigh against disciplinary review of 
prosecutors’ charging decisions and other discretionary decisions.151  This is not to 
                                                                                                                            
to review prosecutorial discretion on the ground that separation-of-powers concerns prohibit such 
review. . . . The hands-off approach of the courts seems to reflect their view . . . that it would be 
unwise to interfere with prosecutors’ ability to manage the business of criminal justice.”).  See also 
Stephens, supra note 17, at 57 n.31, 64 n.82 (citing cases). 
147 See, e.g., United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299–1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (as 
amended on denial of reh’g) (“It would raise serious separation of powers questions—as well as a 
host of virtually insurmountable practical problems—for the district court to inquire into and 
supervise the inner workings of the United States Attorney’s Office. . . . The court would also have to 
consider the validity of various rationales advanced for particular charging decisions, which would 
enmesh it deeply into the policies, practices and procedures of the United States Attorney’s Office. . . 
. Such judicial entanglement in the core decisions of another branch of government—especially as to 
those bearing directly and substantially on matters litigated in federal court—is inconsistent with the 
division of responsibilities assigned to each branch by the Constitution.”). 
148 See, e.g., id. at 1299 (“Prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions are particularly 
ill-suited for broad judicial oversight. In the first place, they involve exercises of judgment and 
discretion that are often difficult to articulate in a manner suitable for judicial evaluation.”); id. at 
1300 (“[T]he court would have to second-guess the prosecutor’s judgment in a variety of cases to 
determine whether the reasons advanced therefor are a subterfuge.”). 
149 Id. at 1299 (“Such decisions are normally made as a result of careful professional judgment 
as to the strength of the evidence, the availability of resources, the visibility of the crime and the 
likely deterrent effect on the particular defendant and others similarly situated.”). 
150 Id. at 1299–1300 (“The very breadth of the inquiry—whether the prosecutor’s discretion 
was exercised in an arbitrary or capricious fashion—would require that the government divulge 
minute details about the process by which scores, perhaps hundreds, of charging decisions are 
made.”).  
151 Notably, some lower federal courts seem to assume that state courts have disciplinary 
authority to punish prosecutors’ abuses of charging discretion, notwithstanding the high level of 
deference traditionally accorded in federal criminal adjudication.  See, e.g., Soulier v. Haukaas, 477 
Fed. Appx. 388, 390 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding prosecutor entitled to immunity for any violation of 
plea-bargaining power “because plea bargaining is intimately associated with a prosecutorial 
function. . . . [a]nd other means of correcting injustice, such as . . . professional discipline, are 
available to hold accountable prosecutors who abuse their power”); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 
42 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30–A, § 257) (identifying “professional discipline 
of the miscreant prosecutor as the readily available safeguards against constitutional abuse” and 
distinguishing between “the federal judicial system where the power of the courts to control a 
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say that these considerations are implicated to precisely the same degree in each 
context.  For example, confidentiality concerns are arguably less serious in the 
disciplinary context, where review can be undertaken in camera.152  On the other 
hand, concerns about chilling prosecutors may be even more compelling in the 
disciplinary context, as the risk of personal consequences may chill some 
prosecutors from making some hard, but legitimate, decisions, and may altogether 
discourage other capable lawyers from becoming prosecutors.153 
Still, notwithstanding these considerations, there are reasons to question the 
common assumption that discipline cannot address abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Significantly, most criminal prosecutions are adjudicated by state 
courts, some of which have not adopted federal courts’ deferential approach to 
prosecutorial decision-making based on separation of powers considerations.  As 
Darryl Brown has recently documented, “some states have recognized the judicial 
capacity for a modest supervisory role over critical aspects of prosecutorial 
discretion” and “some state courts have departed from federal conceptions of 
separation of powers.”154   In fact, it appears that many state courts recognize 
adjudicatory authority, pursuant to state statute or common law, to review various 
aspects of prosecutors’ charging decisions. 
For example, in some states, courts may inquire into whether the prosecutor 
acted improperly in failing to initiate criminal charges and, upon finding an 
impropriety, they may direct the prosecutor to bring the case to trial155 or appoint a 
special prosecutor to do so.156  Typically, review of the non-charging decision is 
                                                                                                                            
prosecutor’s term are strictly limited” and the enhanced judicial authority in state law, including 
Maine statute “provid[ing] a highly specific mechanism to evaluate a prosecutor’s work[,]. . . . 
permit[ting] a judicial proceeding to be commenced against a District Attorney, upon complaint by 
the Attorney General, to determine whether the District Attorney is ‘performing the duties of office 
faithfully and efficiently’ and to remove him if he is not”).  
152 See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317, 335 (Conn. 1995) 
(rejecting argument that disciplinary review of prosecutors would have adverse effect on the 
confidentiality of prosecutors’ charging decisions, noting that, unlike an adjudicatory proceeding held 
in open court, “[s]ensitive material contained within a response to a grievance complaint . . . can be 
sealed upon motion”). 
153 See, e.g., Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d at 1299 (“[A] court would find it nearly impossible to 
lay down guidelines to be followed by prosecutors in future cases. We would be left with prosecutors 
not knowing when to prosecute and judges not having time to judge.”).  The Supreme Court has 
identified similar concerns as underlying the doctrine of immunity for prosecutors.  See Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–24 (1976). 
154 Brown, supra note 136, at 1250–51.  See id. at 1251–53 nn.94–103 and accompanying text.  
155 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 767.41; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606.  See also, 
Brown, supra note 136, at 1252 n.99. 
156 See, e.g., TN CONST. art. 6, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 16; ALA. CODE § 12-17-186(a); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-805; State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 364–65 (1977) (citing 
MINN. STAT. § 388.12); Kailey v. Chambers, 261 P.3d 792 (Colo. App. 2011) (citing COLO. REV. 
STAT. Ann. § 16-5-209); State v. Muller, 588 A.2d 393, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Wilson 
v. Koppy, 653 N.W.2d 68, 72 (N.D. 2002) (citing N.D. CENT CODE § 11-16-06).  
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initiated by complaint of a private party,157 growing out of the tradition of private 
prosecution that extends back to the nineteenth-century.158  Similarly, various state 
courts have authority to deny the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss a criminal charge 
where there is sufficient evidence to support continuing the prosecution.159 
Insofar as state courts’ review of charging decisions is based on an evaluation 
of the strength of the evidence—e.g., whether there is probable cause or a prima 
facie case of guilt—it might seem that the courts are making a traditionally 
adjudicatory decision, rather than questioning the prosecutor’s exercise of 
judgment. 160   It is clear, however, that state court review of prosecutors’ 
discretionary decisions is not always limited to weighing the evidence of guilt.  In 
some states, trial courts have the authority to supersede a prosecutor’s charging 
decision by dismissing a charge on their own motion in the interests of justice161 or 
                                                                                                                            
 
157 See, e.g., N.J. MUN. CT. R. 7:2-2(a)(1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.09(D) (West 2015); 
16 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1409; PA. R. CRIM. P. 506; WIS. STAT. § 968.02(3); WIS. STAT. 
§ 968.26; State v. Murphy, 584 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Idaho 1978); State v. Martineau, 808 A.2d 51, 52–
53 (N.H. 2002); Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan,774 A.2d 866, 872 (R.I. 2001); Harman v. Frye, 425 
S.E.2d 566, 576 (W. Va. 1992); State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(Wis. 2004). 
158 See Beth A. Brown, Note, The Constitutional Validity of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 133(b)(2) and the Traditional Role of the Pennsylvania Courts in the Prosecutorial 
Function, 52 U. PITT L. REV. 269 (1990); Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial 
Inaction: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488 (1988); Comment, Private 
Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955); 
Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing 
Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CAL. L. REV. 727 (1988). 
159 See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 585(A); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); Manning v. Engelkes, 281 
N.W.2d 7, 10–11 (Iowa 1979); Myers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d. 782, 792 n.13 (W. Va. 1984); State v. 
Kenyon, 270 N.W.2d. 160, 163 (Wis. 1978).  See also Manning, 281 N.W.2d at 13 (distinguishing 
state and federal approaches to judicial role in prosecutorial dismissals); State v. Layman, 214 
S.W.3d 442, 451 (Tenn. 2007).   See generally Brown, supra note 136, at 1246–47 nn.76 & 78. 
160 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stivala, 645 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (upholding PA. R. 
CRIM. P. 313):  
[I]t is apparent that the determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
a prima facie case is ultimately a judicial one and subject to the trial court’s 
determination. . . . Based on that pretrial state of the evidence, [the trial court] determined 
that there was sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case and, therefore, denied 
the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi.  We cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in ruling as it did.  
Id. at 262. 
161 See State v. Echols, 793 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (citing ALASKA R. CRIM. 
P. 43(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385; IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 48(a)(2); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 27(1); MINN. STAT. 
§ 631.21; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-201; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 
815; OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755; P.R. R. CRIM. P. 247(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-4; VT. R. CRIM. P. 
48(b)(2); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 8.3)).  See also People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 420 (N.Y. 1983) 
(citations omitted) (“Although the current version of [the “interests of justice” statute] is, in 
substantial part, the product of its recent amendment, the inherent power it bespeaks has ancient 
roots. . . . [I]t had a respected place in the common law.”); State v. Knapstad, 706 P.2d 238, 240–41 
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in light of the triviality of the offense.162  Notably, when dismissing charges “in the 
interest of justice,” the court is substituting its judgment for that of the prosecutor, 
without necessarily finding misconduct in the form of prosecutorial abuse, 
arbitrariness or bad faith.  In some states, courts may review other discretionary 
decisions, such as prosecutors’ decisions regarding pretrial diversion, that plainly 
call for weighing various policy considerations, not merely assessing the strength 
of the evidence.163 
State courts that engage in more substantial review of prosecutorial decision 
making than their federal counterparts have been undeterred by state constitutional 
principles of separation of powers.  In general, state courts exercise a broader form 
of judicial authority, both when they review prosecutors’ charging decisions164 and 
when they review other discretionary decisions.165  To some degree, their practice 
                                                                                                                            
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (courts have authority “in the furtherance of justice” to dismiss any criminal 
prosecution due to “arbitrary action or governmental misconduct,” as well as “the inherent authority . 
. . to dismiss for insufficiency of the charge”).  See generally Valena Elizabeth Beety, Judicial 
Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629 (2015); Brown, supra note 136, at 1248 
nn.79–81 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 7.67 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (1993); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 17-A, § 12 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11 (West 1995); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONST. 
STAT. ANN. § 312 (West 1998).  See generally Brent G. Filbert, Annotation, Defense of 
Inconsequential or De Minimis Violation in Criminal Prosecution, 68 A.L.R. 5th 299 (1999).  
163 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ayers, 525 A.2d 804 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (upholding PA. R. 
CRIM. P. 179(c)).  But see Commonwealth v. Cline, 800 A.2d 978 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).  See also 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–15–105(b)(3); State v. Lavorgna, 437 A.2d 131, 137–38 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1981); State v. Dalgish, 432 A.2d 74 (N.J. 1981); State v. Webb, No. E2009-02507-CCA-R9-CD, 
2011 WL 5332862, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2011) (citing cases). 
164 See Brown, supra note 136.  See also State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696, 698 
(Wis. 1989) (overruling State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 401 N.W.2d 782 (Wis. 1987)) 
(upholding judicial authority to investigate criminal allegations and initiate criminal charges, and 
overruling earlier decision, on the ground that “the premise of [the previous case]—that initiation of 
criminal prosecution is an exclusively executive power in Wisconsin—is erroneous”); Frank J. 
Remington & Wayne A. Logan, Frank Miller and the Decision to Prosecute, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 159 
(1991); Wayne A. Logan, Comment, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of Wisconsin 
Prosecutors, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1695. 
165 See, e.g., People v. Ford, 331 N.W.2d 878, 898 (Mich. 1982) (Levin, J., dissenting) (calling 
on court to reject prosecutorial practice of charging a defendant with a felony for conduct that could 
have been charged as a misdemeanor, on the grounds that “[t]he separation of powers is not absolute” 
and “[t]he manner in which [the prosecutor] exercises that legislatively delegated power is subject to 
judicial review”); State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254–55 (Minn. 1996) (holding that judicial stay 
of adjudication does not violate separation of powers and citing precedent for the proposition that the 
trial “decision to stay adjudication of Krotzer’s charge instead of accepting his guilty plea fell within 
the ‘inherent judicial power’ we have repeatedly recognized, and was necessary to the furtherance of 
justice”); State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607 (N.J. 1977) (holding that separation of powers does not 
preclude judicial review of prosecutors’ pretrial diversion decisions).  See Brown, supra note 136, at 
1248 n.81, 1251 n.96.  But see People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564, 568 35 Cal. 4th 635, 642 (Cal. 2005) 
(holding that statutory requirement “that the criminal court must secure the prosecutor’s consent 
before it can order a Youth Authority commitment violates the state Constitution’s separation of 
powers doctrine”); id. at 566–68 (citing cases). 
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may reflect a different theoretical approach than that of the federal courts.  By way 
of comparison, criminal prosecutors’ discretionary decisions are reviewed by 
courts in other countries. 166   Though, perhaps of limited direct relevance, 167 
practices outside the United States may cast doubt on federal courts’ assumptions 
about the detriment of such judicial review.  More generally, as scholars have 
noted, federal courts’ views regarding separation of powers in the criminal context 
are far from unassailable,168 and state courts have been and remain entitled to see 
things differently.  In part, state courts’ more liberal approach to judicial authority 
in criminal cases may simply reflect a different history.169 
                                                                                                                            
 
166 Some scholars have pointed to continental law models, such as the German system, in 
which “[d]ecisions to prosecute or not prosecute are subject to review by a judge.”  George C. 
Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1043, 1057 (2005).  See also Brown, supra note 136, at 1255 n.107 and accompanying text; 
Yue Ma, A Comparative View of Judicial Supervision of Prosecutorial Discretion, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 
Jan.-Feb. 2008 (2008). 
167 For expressions of skepticism, see, for example, Pizzi, supra note 26, at 1351–62.  See also 
Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial 
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2006); Erik Luna & 
Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413 (2010).  
168 Separation of powers questions are a source of perennial debate.  In particular, some 
scholars question the basis for federal courts’ reliance on separation of powers as a ground for a 
highly deferential approach to prosecutors’ charging decisions.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, 
Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 993 (2006); Brown, supra note 
136, passim; Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and 
Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 13 (2009).  See also Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial 
Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 397 (1976); Kenneth Culp Davis, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 210 (1969); Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of 
Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 204 (1990); 
Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38 
AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989).  Cf. Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987) (“In 
considering the separation of powers[,] . . . we start with the proposition that there is nothing inherent 
in the prosecutorial function that would suggest insulating prosecutorial policies from judicial 
review.”). 
If anything, at least one scholar suggests the degree of authority exercised by federal 
prosecutors contradicts constitutional principles of separation of powers.  See Barkow, supra note 22, 
at 871.  Cf. Davis, supra note 13, at 453, 456. 
169 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stivala, 645 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (noting that 
although “[h]istorically, at common law, a prosecutor had the authority to enter a nolle prosequi on 
his own motion. . . . [t]his unfettered power was modified by” Pennsylvania statutes in 1850 and 
1860, “which required that before a nolle prosequi could be entered, the assent of the proper court 
must be obtained”); State v. Conger, 797 N.W.2d 341, 366 (Wis. 2010) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring) (“Even a brief review of the history of the relative powers of the district attorney and trial 
court in criminal cases thus demonstrates the basic point that there are historically shared powers 
between the executive and judicial branch relating to charging and amending or dismissing 
charges.”); State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696, 698, 699 (Wis. 1989) (noting that the 
“John Doe criminal proceeding has a long history in Wisconsin. . . . [and] has been used by courts, 
pursuant to statute, since 1839” and that “the same procedure we review today was in use in 1848, 
and was presumably considered constitutionally sound by the framers themselves”); id. at 700 (noting 
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Perhaps more to the point, state courts have regularly exercised disciplinary 
review of various aspects of prosecutors’ decision making.  In the first half of the 
twentieth century, state courts exercised regulatory and disciplinary authority in a 
manner that required close judicial scrutiny of prosecutors’ charging decisions, 
notwithstanding arguable concerns about confidentiality and separation of 
powers.170  In particular, courts sanctioned prosecutors for failures to prosecute 
when there was sufficient evidence upon which to file charges.  In some instances, 
prosecutors were disciplined for systematically refusing to bring certain charges, 
typically involving gambling, prostitution or the illegal sale of alcohol. 171   In 
others, prosecutors were punished for failing to prosecute specific individuals.172   
It should be noted that these cases, arguably, do not illustrate an expansive 
exercise of judicial disciplinary authority over prosecutors’ discretionary decisions.  
                                                                                                                            
that the statute has stood “substantially unchanged” for more than one hundred and fifty years, during 
which time “judicial initiation of criminal prosecution[]has never appeared to be considered to be 
inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers”); id. at 700 n.4, 700–01 (citing Samuel 
Becker, Judicial Scrutiny of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Decision Not to File a Complaint, 71 
MARQ. L. REV. 749 (1988)) (noting that “prior to 1945, the filing of a criminal complaint was not 
only allowable as a judicial prerogative, it was probably exclusively a judicial responsibility”); id. at 
700 (citing historical record “cast[ing] grave doubt” on the argument that under the 1969 statute, “the 
charging power was, as a matter of constitutional law, exclusively within the province of the 
executive”).  See also Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New 
Jersey, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1087 (2005) (analyzing New Jersey Attorney General’s issuance of 
“Brimage Guidelines” for plea bargains, in response to New Jersey Supreme Court decisions).  But 
see State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting New Jersey’s approach to separation of 
powers). 
170 See infra note 174.  See also Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317, 
326 (Conn. 1995) (citations omitted) (“It is well established that the judicial branch has the inherent 
power to investigate the conduct of an officer of the court.  ‘The Superior Court possesses inherent 
authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.’”); id. at 327 (“Like 
all attorneys, prosecutors serve as officers of the court.  Therefore, since the days of the Connecticut 
colony, they have been subject to judicial control”); id. (“[T]race the history of prosecutorial power in 
Connecticut to understand the extent to which the judiciary may permissibly interfere with that 
power”); id. (“Unlike its federal counterpart, state prosecutorial power arose initially from the 
common law. The principle of public prosecution for crimes against the sovereign originated in 
colonial times. Prosecutors were appointed by and answerable to the sovereign because public justice 
could not depend upon the financial resources of victims.”); id. (“Because prosecutors were viewed 
as ministers of justice, their duties were . . . considered quasi-judicial and ‘not purely those of an 
executive officer.’”); id. at 331 (finding “nothing in the history of the office of the state’s attorney 
that has required the judicial branch to abdicate its inherent role in the supervision of the bar in favor 
of the executive branch or that has vested the exclusive power to discipline a prosecutor in the 
executive branch”); id. at 332 (“The judiciary is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the 
court rules and must use its inherent power over the administration of justice to prevent action that 
undermines the integrity of the system.”).  
171 See, e.g., In re Graves, 146 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1941); In re Voss, 90 N.W. 15 (N.D. 1902); 
In re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541 (N.D. 1900).  See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 748 n.95.  See generally 
MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6; Note, District Court Discipline of State Prosecutor for Failure to 
Enforce State Laws, 57 YALE L.J. 125 (1947). 
172 Commonwealth ex rel. v. Stump, 57 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1933); In re Burton, 246 P. 188 
(Utah 1926); In re Wakefield, 177 A. 319 (Vt. 1935). 
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It appears that in the early twentieth century, prosecutors were expected to bring 
charges in all cases supported by the evidence, without taking into account policy 
considerations that might favor declining to prosecute.  Accordingly, the 
disciplinary inquiry in cases of failure to prosecute was presumably limited to a 
determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to support prosecution, 
without the need to second-guess a prosecutor’s discretionary judgment.  The same 
limitations would seem to apply in contemporary disciplinary proceedings brought 
against prosecutors for filing charges that were unsupported by probable cause,173 
in violation of ethics rules based on Model Rule 3.8(a), or its predecessor. 174  
Although this inquiry potentially requires disclosure of aspects of the prosecutor’s 
investigation, a court’s principal task involves determining the strength of the 
evidence, a task that courts regularly undertake in adjudication as well. 
Other forms of disciplinary inquiry call into question the motivations for 
prosecutors’ charging decisions, in a way that illustrates a more direct rejection of 
the concerns underlying the federal case law.  For example, prosecutors have been 
held to be subject to discipline for accepting a bribe or gratuity in exchange for 
declining to prosecute or dismissing charges,175 or for failure to prosecute a serious 
crime as a result of the lawyer’s “grossly negligent” lack of preparation in the 
case.176  Prosecutors have also been disciplined for making discretionary decisions 
                                                                                                                            
 
173 See In re Leonhardt, 930 P.2d 844 (Or. 1997) (imposing discipline on prosecutor for a 
number of ethics violations, including knowingly filing charges that were not supported by probable 
cause); In re Aubuchon, 309 P.3d 886 (Ariz. 2013); In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-
9002 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012); In re Bunston, 155 P. 1109 (Mont. 1916).  In several other cases, the 
disciplinary charges were not sustained.  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 
573–74 (Md. 2003); In re Burrows, 629 P.2d 820, 826 (Or. 1981); In re Lucareli, 611 N.W.2d 754 
(Wis. 2000).  Several other cases involved Iowa prosecutors who, with the knowledge and approval 
of the trial judge, allowed defendants charged with more serious crimes (as to which there was 
probable cause) to plead guilty to minor motor vehicle offenses that had no relationship to the 
defendants’ alleged conduct.  See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205 
(Iowa 2007); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176 (Iowa 2005); Iowa Sup. 
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 2005).  Interestingly, the practice 
condemned by the Iowa Supreme Court in these decisions is openly undertaken in many other states.  
See Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961 (2010). 
174 These rules essentially codify the constitutional restriction on prosecuting a charge without 
probable cause.  See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
175 See, e.g., In re Wilson, 258 P.2d 433 (Ariz. 1953); People v. Anglim, 78 P. 687 (Colo. 
1904); In re Norris, 57 P. 528 (Kan. 1899); In re Bell, 72 So. 3d 825 (La. 2011); In re Jackson, 27 So. 
3d 273 (La. 2010); In re Burks, 964 So. 2d 298 (La. 2007); In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 
1988); In re Biggers, 104 P. 1083 (Okla. 1909).  Cf. Boyne v. Ryan, 34 P. 707, 708 (Cal. 1893) (“Of 
course, if in a clear case he should willfully, corruptly, or inexcusably refuse to perform his duty in 
the premises, he could be proceeded against for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office.”). 
176 See In re Segal, 617 A.2d 238, 244 (N.J. 1992) (quoting RPC 1.1(a), RPC 1.3) (imposing 
discipline for prosecutor’s failure to prepare adequately to prosecute a case, in violation of ethics 
rules providing in part that “[a] lawyer shall not: (a) Handle or neglect a matter entrusted to the 
lawyer in such manner that the lawyer’s conduct constitutes gross negligence” and “[a] lawyer shall 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”). 
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in instances where they had conflicts of interests, based on a professional, familial 
or business relationship with the putative defendant, or where their own financial 
interests were at stake.177  Although the applicable disciplinary standard in these 
cases does not require a court to substitute its policy judgment for that of the 
prosecutor, it does require a greater intrusion into confidentiality and greater 
entanglement in the decision-making process than a mere review of the sufficiency 
of the evidence against the accused. 
Whatever the theoretical justification, in practice, numerous state courts have 
exercised the authority to discipline prosecutors, expressing little doubt over their 
authority to do so.  In late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
disciplinary cases against prosecutors, state courts repeatedly emphasized judicial 
authority and responsibility to impose discipline as a response to prosecutorial 
misconduct, including in the context of charging decisions.178  Contemporary state 
courts have continued to reject prosecutors’ separation of powers arguments, 
implicitly or explicitly.179 
                                                                                                                            
 
177 See, e.g., In re Bevins, 26 Haw. 570 (Haw. 1922); In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 
1988).  See also MacLean & Wilks, supra note 6 (citing cases); Zacharias, supra note 6, at 723–34 
nn.6–7 (citing cases). 
178 See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Pelletier, 134 N.E. 407 (Mass. 1922) (rejecting separation of powers 
argument in upholding judicial authority, pursuant to a statute, to remove a prosecutor from office for 
commission of a number of ethical violations, including failure to prosecute); In re Simpson, 83 N.W. 
541, 553 (N.D. 1900) (imposing discipline for failure to prosecute, finding that “[t]he power to 
discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of 
record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions”); In re Burton, 246 P. 
188 (Utah 1926) (citing both statutory authority and court’s “inherent power . . . to cancel and revoke 
[prosecutor’s] license and bar him from thereafter engaging in the practice of the law” for ethical 
violations including failure to prosecute, “though he, at the time, may hold a judicial or other official 
position”); In re Jones, 39 A. 1087, 1090–91 (Vt. 1898) (finding that prosecutor was “acting in his 
official capacity as an attorney of this court, and under the obligations assumed by him when he 
became such attorney” and that therefore “it is, beyond question, the right and duty of this court to 
deal with him as justice demands” and “[i]t may suspend or disbar him” for failure to prosecute); 
State v. Hays, 61 S.E. 355, 356 (W. Va. 1908) (finding that “[t]he mere fact that [the prosecutor] is 
liable to indictment for malfeasance in office, and to removal therefrom, does in no way affect the 
power and duty of the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys for the same misconduct for 
which he could be also both indicted and removed”). 
179 See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317 (Conn. 1995) 
(holding, on the basis of both historical and normative principles, that separation of powers did not 
preclude judicial regulation and sanction of a prosecutor for misconduct committed in the course of 
the exercise of prosecutorial functions, including prosecuting a case without probable cause to 
believe defendant was guilty); cf. In re Appointment of Special State’s Att’y, 713 N.E. 2d 168, 177 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (upholding judicial authority to terminate special State Attorney’s appointment 
pursuant to statute, on the grounds that the attorney was “unable to attend” to duties, and holding that 
judge’s order “was consistent with the judicial branch’s role of supervising those attorneys who 
practice before it” and that “[t]he court’s overall supervision of a specially appointed State’s Attorney 
is not a judicial usurpation of executive discretion and does not constitute a violation of separation of 
powers”).  See generally Melissa K. Atwood, Comment, Who Has the Last Word?: An Examination 
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The 1976 Oregon decision, In re Rook, 180  provides a particularly helpful 
illustration of a court’s willingness to employ disciplinary authority to rein in 
abuses of prosecutorial discretion.  After making a plea offer to one defendant, 
Rook refused to offer a similar deal to fifteen similarly situated defendants because 
they were represented by either of two attorneys whom Rook mistrusted.  
Significantly, plea bargain policies—particularly decisions to refuse to offer a plea 
bargain to a defendant—are often cited by courts as an area of prosecutorial 
discretion outside of the purview of adjudicatory review.181  Here, however, the 
court disciplined the prosecutor for engaging in conduct “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”182  The court reasoned that the prosecutor violated a 
state statute requiring that “[s]imilarly situated defendants should be afforded equal 
plea agreement opportunities,”183 and that the prosecutor’s plea bargain policy was 
motivated by “overzealousness,” “frustration,” “animosity and a desire to 
punish.”184  The court observed that “to our knowledge, this is the first reported 
decision not only in Oregon, but in any other jurisdiction in the United States, 
involving a charge of misconduct against a prosecuting attorney in refusing to plea 
bargain with a criminal defendant.”185 
While it seems unlikely that federal courts would undertake such inquiry into 
a prosecutor’s motivations, state courts have been less restrained, adopting a more 
liberal view of judicial power.186  Moreover, regardless of any separation of power 
concerns, Rook demonstrates the authority and ability of a state court to inquire 
after-the-fact and sanction the prosecutor, if necessary, for an abuse of discretion, 
particularly for a violation of a statutory standard. 
In sum, it is far from clear that federal separation of powers limitations on 
federal judges’ oversight of prosecutors’ discretion should be applicable to state 
court disciplinary regulation.  State courts exercise the inherent authority to 
regulate the practice of law in their own jurisdiction, through which they enact and 
implement ethics rules that potentially subject lawyers to discipline.  
Notwithstanding concerns about separation of powers and the deference owed to 
prosecutorial discretionary decisions, state court opinions often demonstrate an 
                                                                                                                            
of the Authority of State Bar Grievance Committees to Investigate and Discipline Prosecutors for 
Breaches of Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 201 (1998).  
180 In re Rook, 556 P.2d 1351 (Or. 1976). 
181 See generally Brown, supra note 136.  
182 In re Rook, 556 P.2d at 1355 (citing DR 1-102(A)(5)). 
183 OR. REV. STAT. § 135.405(4). 
184 In re Rook, 556 P.2d at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
185 Id. at 1357. 
186 See Boulas v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (ordering dismissal 
of prosecution, based on prosecutorial misconduct in conditioning favorable plea on defendant’s 
hiring a different lawyer); cf. Bourexis v. Carroll Cty. Narcotics Task Force, 625 A.2d 391 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1993) (agreeing that prosecutors cannot discriminate against the particular lawyer’s 
clients, but concluding that lawyer lacks standing to complain).  
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overriding concern for judicial authority and responsibility to review and respond 
to prosecutorial misconduct.  Contrary to the assumptions of several scholars, state 
courts have rejected separation of powers arguments in favor of judicial 
responsibility to ensure the fair administration of justice through the exercise of 
their authority to review charging decisions.  Moreover, the relative infrequency of 
state court disciplinary review of prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining 
decisions may not reflect a view that the state constitution forbids courts from 
intruding into prosecutors’ exercise of discretion.  Alternatively, disciplinary 
authorities may have a general reluctance to proceed against prosecutors, in part 
because prosecutors’ motivations and processes for making charging and plea 
bargaining decisions are rarely visible; indeed, in the case of declinations, even the 
fact that a decision was made may not always be visible outside the prosecutor’s 
office. 
 
B. State Court Adoption or Interpretation of Disciplinary Rules to Regulate 
Prosecutors’ Charging Decisions 
 
In Section A, we showed that state courts’ disciplinary authority allows a 
measure of inquiry into prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining practices.  
Among other points, we noted, it would be reasonable for state courts to discipline 
prosecutors who abuse their discretion in violation of constitutional or statutory 
standards.  The more difficult question, however, is the extent of state courts’ 
rulemaking authority to establish independent disciplinary standards that govern 
prosecutors’ exercise of charging and plea bargaining discretion, and the degree to 
which that power is limited by state constitutional separation of powers 
principles.187 
In Rook, for example, the court relied on the prosecutor’s violation of a 
statutory standard as the ground for imposing discipline for the prosecutor’s abuse 
of charging discretion.  Absent the statutory violation, might the court have 
punished the prosecutor for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice?  
Doing so would imply independent judicial authority to adopt an ethics rule that 
has the effect of forbidding a prosecutor from making arbitrary or improperly 
motivated charging or plea bargaining decisions.  Such lawmaking authority might 
derive from courts’ inherent or supervisory power to regulate lawyers,188 or from 
the power that some state courts have exercised to remove prosecutors who are not 
faithfully carrying out the duties of the office.189   
                                                                                                                            
 
187 Additional questions, which we do not explore here, might be raised insofar as state or 
federal courts sought to apply independent disciplinary standards to federal prosecutors.  See 
generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 381 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate 
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of A Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003). 
188 See, e.g., Zacharias & Green, supra note 187, at 1308 n.12. 
189 See supra note 174. 
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Early disciplinary decisions sanctioning prosecutors for failure to prosecute 
do not resolve this question,190 because they were premised on the prosecutor’s 
statutory obligation to bring all cases supported by sufficient evidence.191  Today, 
in contrast, prosecutors are generally expected to balance a variety of legitimate 
considerations in deciding whether to prosecute in individual cases or classes of 
cases in which there is sufficient evidence of guilt to go forward.192  Thus, like 
Rook, the early cases support the authority of state courts to sanction prosecutors 
for charging decisions that violate statutory law, but they leave open the question 
of state courts’ authority to establish their own disciplinary standards governing 
prosecutors’ charging discretion.193 
Nor is this question resolved by cases in which courts have disciplined 
prosecutors for making discretionary decisions in instances where they had 
conflicts of interests.194  In these cases, rather than reviewing the substance of the 
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion, the courts imposed discipline on the grounds 
that prosecutors with conflicts of interests should not participate in the matter at 
all.  Therefore, the conflict cases do not resolve whether courts have the authority, 
absent a settled legal standard, to sanction prosecutors for abusing their discretion.  
However, a handful of other contemporary decisions suggest some 
willingness among state courts to look beyond established law and to invoke their 
own disciplinary standards to regulate prosecutors’ discretionary charging and plea 
bargaining decisions.  For example, a New Jersey prosecutor was sanctioned for 
fixing traffic tickets as a favor for someone with connections to the police and 
political figures.195  Notably, unlike other cases where prosecutors were punished 
for fixing tickets,196 the prosecutor did not act criminally or to serve his own 
                                                                                                                            
 
190  See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
191 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Hipple, 69 Pa. 9, 1870 WL 8849 (Pa. 1870), 
at *6; see also Ex parte Hayter, 116 P. 370, 374–75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1911); State on Info. of 
McKittrick v. Graves, 144 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. 1940); State on Info. of McKittrick v. Wymore, 132 
S.W.2d 979 (Mo. 1939); State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1953).   
192 See, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4 (4th 
ed. 2015) (stating that “[i]n order to fully implement the prosecutor’s functions and duties, including 
the obligation to enforce the law while exercising sound discretion, the prosecutor is not obliged to 
file or maintain all criminal charges which the evidence might support” and listing “factors which the 
prosecutor may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal 
charge, even though it meets the requirements” for prosecution under Standard 3-4.3).  
193 Cf. Armstrong [Armstead] v. Harkness, No. 02-C-687-C, 2002 WL 32344429 (W.D. Wis. 
Dec. 30, 2002) (citation omitted) (“The decision to initiate a criminal prosecution is within the 
exclusive province of the prosecutor.  If a prosecutor cannot be held liable for deciding not to 
prosecute, [the Florida Bar] cannot be held liable for declining to discipline a prosecutor for 
exercising his or her discretion.”). 
194 See supra notes 73 & 177.  
195 In re Weishoff, 382 A.2d 632 (N.J. 1978). 
196 For other cases in which prosecutors have been disciplined for improperly dismissing 
criminal cases and traffic tickets, see, for example, In re Bell, 72 So. 3d 825 (La. 2011); In re 
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financial self-interest, nor did the prosecutor have a personal connection to the 
defendant such that participating in the matter involved a conflict of interest.197  
Nevertheless, it was plain to the court that the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion 
was punishable in that it was based on an impermissible consideration: The 
prosecutor favored individuals in the criminal process because of their 
connections.  Likewise, as the more recent disciplinary case against Andrew 
Thomas illustrates, 198  courts may consider themselves authorized to discipline 
prosecutors for factoring impermissible considerations—such as political 
animosity—into their charging decisions.   
The most far-reaching and illuminating decision on courts’ disciplinary 
authority to set independent standards regulating prosecutorial discretion may be a 
2012 case, In re Flatt-Moore,199 in which an Indiana prosecutor was reprimanded 
for conditioning a favorable plea bargain on the defendant’s willingness to meet 
the victim’s demand for restitution in an amount exceeding the victim’s actual loss.  
The court stated that although prosecutors have discretion to consider the victim’s 
input, they may not put the terms of plea bargains “entirely in the hands of the 
victims,” because then “defendants whose victims are unreasonable or vindictive 
cannot receive the same consideration as defendants whose victims are reasonable 
in their demands. . . .  [R]esolution of criminal charges could [appear to] turn on 
the whims of victims rather than the equities of each case.”200  While in Thomas, 
abuses of prosecutorial discretion were overshadowed by other forms of 
prosecutorial misconduct, 201  in Flatt-Moore, the improper use of the charging 
power was the sole ground for discipline.  
The Flatt-Moore decision is thus a potentially strong, albeit implicit, 
vindication of judicial power to set disciplinary standards for prosecutorial abuse 
of charging discretion.  Significantly, unlike disciplinary cases involving bribery or 
prosecutorial violations of constitutional or legislative standards, the restriction the 
Flatt-Moore court imposed on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was both 
judicially constructed and, even if justified, far from obvious and at least subject to 
debate.  After all, the court’s conclusion that similar cases should not be treated 
differently based on the different preferences of victims is not self-evident.  
Indeed, prosecutors are ordinarily permitted or expected to take account of victims’ 
                                                                                                                            
Jackson, 27 So. 3d 273 (La. 2010); In re Burks, 964 So. 2d 298 (La. 2007); In re Serstock, 432 
N.W.2d 179 (Minn. 1988); In re Rosen, 452 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).  
197 In re Weishoff, 382 A.2d 632 at 635 (finding that “respondent, in acting as he did, sought 
no personal profit for himself and merely thought he was doing a ‘favor’”). 
198 In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012).  See supra notes 
101–06 and accompanying text. 
199 In re Flatt-Moore, 959 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. 2012). 
200 Id. at 245.  See also In re Bonet, 29 P.3d 1242 (Wash. 2001) (imposing discipline for 
prosecutor’s offer to dismiss charges against defendant in exchange for defendant’s agreement not to 
testify on behalf of co-defendant). 
201 See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text. 
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interests, and in some jurisdictions they are required by law to do so. 202  For 
example, it is at least plausible that in deciding whether to seek the death penalty in 
a capital case, a prosecutor may defer to the preferences of a victim’s family,203 or 
that in deciding whether to offer a favorable plea in a domestic violence case, a 
prosecutor may defer to the victim’s preference whether or not to testify at trial.  
Although the court in Flatt-Moore found that the prosecutor overvalued the 
victim’s interests, the prosecutor’s decision making was apparently based on a 
broad evaluation of legitimate considerations, not on an impermissible or irrelevant 
relationship with the victim. 
Nevertheless, the court criticized the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion on the 
ground that the victim’s desire for greater compensation seemed “unreasonable” or 
“vindictive.” 204   Apparently, from the court’s perspective, the prosecutor 
essentially enabled a private party to take the prosecutorial reins for the purposes 
of extorting excessive civil restitution.  Arguably, however, from the prosecutor’s 
perspective, it may have seemed appropriate for victims of financial crimes to be 
compensated in a greater amount than their actual loss, taking into account the 
costs, including money, time, and anxiety, attributable to pursuing restitution.  In 
rejecting this approach, the court appears to have exercised the authority to 
substitute its judgment about prosecutorial priorities for those of the prosecutor, 
thus reaching a decision that may have broad implications for questions regarding 
the extent and limits of judicial authority to establish and enforce disciplinary 
standards for prosecutor’s charging decisions. 
Finally, it should be noted that expanded judicial exercise of disciplinary 
authority to regulate prosecutors’ charging and plea bargaining decisions would 
not be limited to reviewing and potentially meting out punishment in response to 
accusations of prosecutorial misconduct.  State courts could also set standards 
regulating prosecutorial discretion, either by adopting additional rules of 
                                                                                                                            
 
202 See People v. Mack, 473 N.E.2d 880, 886 (Ill. 1984) (“This court’s attention has not been 
directed to any decisions holding that it is unconstitutional for a prosecutor to consider the wishes of 
the victim’s family in deciding whether to plea bargain. Our own research has not disclosed any such 
cases. In some States there are statutes which specifically allow or require a prosecutor to consider 
the wishes of the victim’s family in conducting plea-bargaining discussions.”), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Mack v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987); Commonwealth v. Latimore, 667 
N.E.2d 818, 824 (Mass. 1996) (holding that prosecutor “may consider the harm or impact to the 
victim and the victim’s family, and may give deference to the views of the victim and the victim’s 
family, when deciding whether to agree with the defendant and ask that the judge accept a plea to a 
lesser charge or to oppose the judge’s acceptance of a defendant’s plea to a lesser charge”); 5 WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(f) (4th 
ed. 2009) (“Provisions on prosecutor/victim consultation are quite common; they exist in about two-
thirds of the states as well as on the federal level.”); id. at nn.379–90 (citing statutes). 
203 See, e.g., Mack, 473 N.E.2d at 887 (holding that “a prosecutor is not barred from 
considering the wishes of the victim’s family in determining whether to accept an offered plea 
bargain in a case where capital punishment is a possibility”). 
204 Flatt-Moore, 959 N.E.2d at 245 (Ind. 2012). 
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professional conduct explicitly addressing prosecutors’ discretionary decision 
making,205 or by issuing interpretive opinions applying existing ethics rules in the 
context of charging and plea bargaining.206   For example, courts might forbid 
practices that, though lawful, seem ethically problematic, such as pursuing 
criminal charges unless an arrestee waives colorable civil rights claims, 207  or 
making “exploding” plea offers that are withdrawn before defense counsel can 
adequately investigate the case and competently advise the defendant.208  However, 
whether and how courts should exercise robust disciplinary authority are questions 
that will remain for another day.209 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Our examination of state court review of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions, 
in the context of both adjudication and discipline, does not justify, with any degree 
of confidence, predictions about the future expansion of disciplinary authority over 
prosecutors’ charging decisions.  Recent cases, such as Thomas and Flatt-Moore, 
in which courts disciplined prosecutors for abusing their discretion, might be 
viewed as aberrations or, alternatively, as modest and tentative steps with 
important potential implications for a more expansive exercise of courts’ 
regulatory authority.  
Nevertheless, the extensive historical and contemporary record of judicial 
review of prosecutors’ charging decisions may indeed suggest a justification for 
state courts, if they so choose, to regulate prosecutorial discretion more 
                                                                                                                            
 
205  See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.  
206 See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 156–57 (Ky. 2014) (affirming bar 
association ethics opinion finding that it is unethical for a prosecutor to include an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel waiver in a plea agreement because doing so induces defense counsel to violate 
the conflict-of-interest rule and, additionally, is contrary to prosecutor’s role as “minister of justice”).  
207 See Erin P. Bartholomy, An Ethical Analysis of the Release-Dismissal Agreement, 7 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 331 (1993); Andrew B. Coan, The Legal Ethics of Release-
Dismissal Agreements: Theory and Practice, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 371 (2005); Andrea Hyatt, 
Release-Dismissal Agreement Validity—From Per Se Invalidity to Conditional Validity, and Now 
Turning Back to Per Se Invalidity, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1135 (1994); Ken Takahashi, The Release-
Dismissal Agreement: An Imperfect Instrument of Dispute Resolution, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1769 
(1994); James A. Trowbridge, Restraining the Prosecutor: Restrictions on Threatening Prosecution 
for Civil Ends, 37 ME. L. REV. 41, 49–53 (1985).  
208 See Vida B. Johnson, A Plea for Funds: Using Padilla, Lafler and Frye to Increase Public 
Defender Resources, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 403, 419–20 (2014); Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s 
Guarding the Henhouse? How the American Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He is Sworn to 
Protect, 51 Washburn L.J. 513, 550 (2012). 
209 Likewise, this Article leaves open the question of whether, in comparison with other 
approaches, enhanced judicial exercise of disciplinary authority might provide a more appropriate 
and effective mechanism for responding to the problem of abuse of prosecutorial power.  See, e.g., 
Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for Abuses of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2016). 
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meaningfully.  Likewise, law reform advocates seeking avenues to respond to 
documented and perceived incidents of prosecutorial abuse of discretion may be 
encouraged to give a fresh look to the possible role of state court disciplinary 
regulation.  Ultimately, it would appear that the extent to which state courts might 
be expected to exercise a more robust form of disciplinary authority over 
prosecutorial charging decisions will turn on courts’ broader understanding of 
judicial responsibility to ensure the fair administration of justice within the 
confines of their interpretation of the limitations that state constitutions impose on 
judicial power. 
